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INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE PRACTICE
OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
Lisa Schultz Bressman*
Michael P. Vandenbergh**
From the inception of the administrative state, scholars have proposed
various models of agency decison-making to render such decison-making
accountable and effective, only to see those models falter when confronted
by actual practice. Until now, the "presidential control" model has been
largely impervious to this pattern. That model, which brings agency deci-
son-making under the direction of the president, has strengthened over
time, winning broad scholarly endorsement and bipartisan political sup-
port. But it, like prior models, relies on abstractions-for example, that the
president represents public preferences and resists parochial pressures-
that do not hold up as a factual matter. Although recent empirical analyses
purport to validate the model, they fall short because they examine how the
White House exercises control without considering how agencies experi-
ence control. This Article is the first to study the practice of presidential
control from inside the administrative state. We interviewed the top politi-
cal officials at the Environmental Protection Agency from the George H. W.
Bush and William J. Clinton administrations during 1989-2001. Our data,
which do not vary substantially between respondents of different presiden-
tial administrations, suggest that White House involvement is more
complex and less positive than previous accounts acknowledge. But we do
not conclude that the presidential control model lacks merit. Indeed, our
respondents recognize that the president has a role to play in controlling
agency decision-making. We therefore conclude that the presidential con-
trol model requires reworking to remain valid in practice as well as in
theory. We identify next steps in that direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Theories of agency decision-making necessarily depend on propositions
about how the government works. If the propositions are inaccurate or in-
complete, the theory is vulnerable. In this Article, we show that the currently
dominant "presidential control" model of agency decision-making suffers
from exactly that problem.
The presidential control model posits that the president sets national
regulatory policy for agencies to follow.' But the presidential control model
oversimplifies at the critical juncture, the point at which the agencies receive
their directions from the White House. Like previous models, it offers ab-
stractions-for example, that the president represents public preferences and
resists parochial pressures-that founder on the facts. Although recent em-
pirical analyses claim to validate aspects of the theory, they largely
reproduce the generalities. Those empirical analyses seek to verify the
1. For a description of this conception of agency decision-making, see Cynthia R. Farina,
The "Chief Executive" and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 180-84
(1997).
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model by examining White House sources, either the president's advisors or
his regulatory review arm, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA"). But the studies are influenced by the theory. They consider how
the White House exercises the control function without considering how
agencies experience that control function.
This Article uses empirical methods to engage the theory in a more sat-
isfactory way. It is the first to investigate the practice of presidential control
from inside the administrative state. We interviewed the top political offi-
cials at the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") from the George
H.W. Bush ("Bush I") and William J. Clinton administrations during 1989-
2001.2 We thus studied the agency with more high-cost rules than any other,
across administrations of different political parties.3 From this vantage point,
we were able to observe whether the EPA experiences White House inter-
vention in the way that the presidential control model supposes.
Our claim is not that agency insiders have any epistemic advantage in
ascertaining whether the presidential control model is correct. Rather, we
claim that agency officials are the right people to ask about the messages
that they receive from the White House-and more particularly, whether
those messages are rational and transparent and responsive and balanced, as
proponents of the presidential control model contend. They are experts as to
these facts.
EPA respondents suggest that the presidential control model paints too
superficial a picture. Such respondents did not view White House involve-
ment in EPA rule-making as working as well as it might. Furthermore, the
Bush I and Clinton respondents did not reflect substantial differences in
their views, suggesting that our results are not simply the product of one
presidential administration or one political party.4 In light of our evidence,
we suggest that scholars should rethink the conventional wisdom that has
prevailed in regulatory circles since the Reagan Era.
At the outset, we demonstrate that scholars may have underestimated the
complexity of White House involvement. Presidential control is a "they," not
an "it."5 But EPA respondents did not merely confirm that both OIRA and
other White House offices are involved in EPA rule-making. Rather, they
indicated that OIRA is not the primary source of influence on many major
rule-makings, as scholars typically assume. OIRA often takes a back seat to
other White House offices when both are involved. Although OIRA exerts
influence on many day-to-day issues, other White House offices often wield
more influence on high-profile or high-stakes matters. EPA respondents also
highlighted an ill-appreciated dynamic: White House offices form coalitions
2. For survey methodology, see infra Part II.
3. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investiga-
tion, 70 U. CHi. L. REV. 821, 872 (2003).
4. For a comparison, see infra Part H.
5. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, OMB and the Centralized Review of Regulation
45 (NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=786486; Croley, supra note 3, at 873.
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for or against the EPA. These coalitions frequently enlist OIRA to batter or
shield the EPA rather than to avail themselves of the independent value of
its regulatory review.
Conversely, we reveal that scholars may have overestimated the regular-
ity of presidential control. According to EPA respondents, OIRA review and
other White House involvement are unsystematic. Furthermore, both appear
to be triggered in many cases not just by the need for centralized oversight
of particular regulatory matters but also by the interest of the particular offi-
cials involved. Such selective intervention is not particularly surprising;
realistically, the White House cannot-and perhaps should not-get in-
volved in all regulatory matters. Furthermore, such selective intervention is
not all bad. It may comport with political priorities and even facilitate politi-
cal accountability where it happens to exist. The difficulty is that it may not
serve to rationalize agency decision-making in the sense that a model of
administrative law should.
We next show, contrary to widespread belief, that OIRA review may not
achieve regulatory efficacy. OIRA staffers appear to have adequate institu-
tional resources to perform cost-benefit analyses. And OIRA review appears
to advance inter-agency coordination somewhat, minimizing overlaps and
conflicts between or among the regulations of different federal agencies. But
OIRA review does not achieve what might be called "intra-agency coher-
ence," which includes reducing redundancies, avoiding inconsistencies, and
eliminating unintended consequences between or among the regulations of a
particular agency.6 Thus, OIRA review fails to discharge one of the central
purposes for which President Reagan created it and all subsequent presi-
dents have maintained it. Furthermore, OIRA review regularly skews rule-
making in a deregulatory direction, even when doing so may be inconsistent
with presidential priorities. We conclude that OIRA review is better thought
of as serving a regulatory cost-reduction function rather than a more "neu-
tral" role.7
We also cast doubt on the extent to which broader White House in-
volvement promotes regulatory effectiveness, at least as to the EPA. EPA
respondents confirmed what scholars already knew, that President Clinton
issued few official directives to the EPA of the sort that he had issued to
other agencies to energize them and induce them to take action. If White
House involvement nonetheless prompted EPA respondents to take action, it
was often by causing them to better defend existing regulatory proposals
rather than to create new ones. Although valuable, this function is not what
scholars envision when arguing that White House involvement improves
regulatory effectiveness.
Perhaps even more noteworthy, we question whether presidential control
facilitates political accountability. EPA respondents believed that they were
6. Cf Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075, 1081 (1986) (contending that OIRA review "encourages pol-
icy coordination, greater political accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions").
7. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 19-42.
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more transparent and responsive than the White House. When asked to iden-
tify the aspects of the EPA process that provided greater public view and
representation, respondents emphasized the notice-and-comment rule-
making procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 8 various
stakeholder and regional meetings, and Federal Advisory Committee Act
("FACA") requirements. 9 Respondents also indicated that the general media
and trade press reported far less often on White House involvement in EPA
rule-making. We conclude, somewhat paradoxically, that agencies, though
not comprising elected officials, may better promote political accountability
than the White House. Of course, political accountability may be defined in
a variety of ways. If it turns solely on whether an elected official supervises
agency decision-making,' ° then presidential control may fit the bill. But to
the extent that political accountability encompasses more than formal or
reflexive relationships between the government and the people, the White
House may do less than it should.' If the White House shapes high-level
issues, it ought to reveal in what manner and through which office or offices
it does so. For now, agencies appear to better represent public preferences
and resist parochial pressures-the asserted aims of political accountability.
We end with a possible conundrum, that presidential control may favor
narrow interests but nevertheless serve national policy interests. EPA re-
spondents stated that the White House frequently favors business groups and
seeks to reduce burdens on such groups. At the same time, respondents re-
ported that the White House frequently advanced national policy interests.
How can it be that EPA respondents believe that the White House simulta-
neously favors special interests and serves national interests? 2 We consider
multiple interpretations to reconcile these results. For example, EPA re-
spondents might believe the conventional bad agency story that "health and
safety agencies are frequently captured by pro-health and safety constituen-
cies, leading to systematically overzealous and inefficient regulation.""
8. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
9. 5 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(3) app. 2 (West 1996) ("Interested persons shall be permitted to at-
tend, appear before, or file statements with any advisory committee, subject to such reasonable rules
or regulations as the Administrator may prescribe.").
10. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994).
11. Cf JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 152 (1997); Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58-70 (1995)
(arguing that the president is accountable because he represents public rather than private interests);
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-32 (2001) (arguing that
the president enhances accountability of agency decision-making by increasing transparency and
responsiveness to the public).
12. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.YU. L. REV. 461, 503-15 (2003) (arguing that the president disserves
public interest when he tolerates or facilitates factional influence on agency decision-making).
13. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 3 (attributing this story to DeMuth & Ginsburg).
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Thus, EPA respondents might view White House involvement as a check on
environmental overreaching.
4
In the end, we find most plausible another explanation: respondents
viewed the president as serving an important role simply because he is the
president, even though he intervened on behalf of regulated entities more
often than environmental interests. What this says is that EPA respondents
understand their place in our governmental structure, which is encouraging.
But their acceptance of presidential control should not obscure the fact that
it may operate in ways that fail to enhance agency legitimacy.
We therefore suggest next steps for improving White House involvement
in agency decision-making. Some are relatively uncontroversial-for exam-
ple, the call for increased transparency of White House involvement. Others
are more provocative-for example, the call for turnover of OIRA career
staff. All are worth serious consideration. White House intervention has be-
come a fixture of the administrative state. Yet high-level officials, from the
agency most subject to such intervention, during both Republican and De-
mocratic administrations, have identified substantial shortcomings. The time
is now to bring the practice of presidential control in line with its promise.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the theoretical debate
about the presidential control model and the leading empirical work on the
subject. Part II details the methodology for our study. Part III reports and
analyzes the results of our study. Part IV offers guidance, in light of our evi-
dence, for retooling the presidential control model to ensure that it achieves
in fact what it offers in theory.
I. THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL MODEL
The debate about White House involvement in agency decision-making
is part of a larger debate about the legitimacy of modern bureaucratic gov-
ernment. The larger debate raises the following questions: How do we
ensure that agency officials are answerable to the people for their decisions
(the problem of political accountability)? How do we ensure that agency
officials make public-regarding decisions rather than narrowly interested
ones (the problem of faction resistance)? How do we ensure that agency
officials make rational and otherwise effective decisions, when viewed both
in isolation and together with other governmental decisions (the problem of
regulatory efficacy)? 5 These questions are interrelated. They seek ways to
tether the administrative state to the constitutional structure, which commits
14. But see id. at 19-42 (arguing that the agency capture story does not find support in po-
litical science literature or public choice theory); J.D. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as
Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2297 (2005) ("[T]he evidence that agency capture is a wide-
spread phenomenon is thin. To the extent that agencies do reflect the views of their client interest
groups, capture is likely to be partial and inconsistent-rarely are groups powerful enough to deter-
mine decisionmaking in every case." (citation omitted)).
15. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
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law-making and law-execution to elected officials. 6 But, more generally,
they seek ways to promote good government.
While these questions cut to the core of democracy, the answers often
graze the surface. The theories of agency decision-making that have arisen
over time rest on oversimplifications about the way the government works.
As a result, they have had only limited power to explain and justify the ad-
ministrative state. The presidential control model has had more force, in part
owing to its bipartisan political appeal. 7 But legal scholars also have given it
more credence for enhancing agency legitimacy than previous theories. In
Section A, we show that the presidential control model suffers from an over-
simplification similar to those that have undermined prior models of agency
decision-making. In Section B, we demonstrate that empirical studies de-
signed to test the presidential control model have failed to deepen it.
A. The Theoretical Debate
Since its inception, the regulatory state has witnessed different theories
or "models" of administrative law that purport to answer questions of
agency legitimacy. The earliest model was the "transmission belt" model,
which understood agencies as merely implementing statutory instructions.
s
If simply obeying statutory instructions, agency officials assumed the vir-
tues of their authors; agency officials were viewed as accountable, faction-
proof, and efficacious as was Congress. In the 1930s, another model arose.
The "expertise" model understood agencies as committed to an ethic of pro-
fessionalism and rationality.' 9 Because they were disciplined, if not
objective, agency officials were better positioned to produce sound regula-
tion and good government than elected officials. By the 1970s, a third model
emerged. The "interest group representation" model understood agencies as
open to all affected interests.' ° In this respect, agency officials were even
more accessible and responsive to the public than were elected officials. A
fourth model appeared in the 1980s. The "presidential control" model un-
derstood agencies as subject to the oversight and management of the chief
executive." For legitimacy purposes, agency officials stood in the shoes of
their boss; they were as accountable, faction-resistant, and efficacious as the
president.
Until the presidential control model, every model foundered on a dis-
connection between theory and practice. The transmission belt model,
16. More formally, they seek ways to square the administrative state with a constitutional
structure that contains only three branches and not a "headless" fourth. See Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 10, at 570-99.
17. See James E Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An
Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DuKE L.J. 851, 853 (2001).
18. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1675.
19. Id. at 1678; see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-17 (1938).
20. Stewart, supra note 15, at 1683, 1687.
21. See Farina, supra note 1, at 180-84.
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though plausible in theory, was unrealistic in practice because agencies
rarely received concrete statutory instructions and were left to their own
devices under broad statutory delegations . The expertise model was vul-
nerable in practice because agencies made political judgments free from
political supervision.23 The interest group representation model was cumber-
some in practice because agencies had to allow and digest so much public
input, and they still comprised unelected officials.24
The presidential control model seemed different. With the president at
the helm, agencies were no longer "headless. '25 Indeed, they had the best
leader possible. Because the president is the one official elected by the en-
tire nation, he is more responsive to and representative of the people than
26Congress. By the same token, he is more resistant to factional influence
than Congress. 27 The president also is uniquely situated to improve the cost-
28
effectiveness and coordination of agency decision-making. Until President
Reagan took office, conventional wisdom held that accountability and effi-
ciency could not coexist because congressional oversight and public
participation increase regulatory decision-making CoStS.29 President Reagan
demonstrated that political control (and hence accountability) was not in-
consistent with regulatory efficacy when exercised through executive
oversight. Thus, presidential control could respond to a particular (often
conservative) concern about agency decision-making: agencies, driven by
health and safety interests, will regulate overzealously and inefficiently.30 At
the same time, presidential control could address the opposite (often liberal)
worry: agencies, naturally inclined to inertia, will regulate sluggishly and
ineffectually.
3
'
Yet critics of the presidential control model argue, in essence, that it,
too, rests on an oversimplification about the way that government works. As
a general matter, scholars have questioned whether the model oversimplifies
our democratic structure-that is, whether it adequately respects congres-
22. Stewart, supra note 15, at 1676-77.
23. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2262.
24. Similar critiques also were true of the procedural and judicial innovations that had oc-
curred in administrative law alongside the models. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 49 (1993) (contending that even the threat
of judicial review has overburdened the administrative process); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 71 (1995) (arguing that judicial review allows
unaccountable courts to inject their judgment).
25. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 570-99.
26. See MASHAW, supra note 11, at 152; Calabresi, supra note Il, at 58-70; Kagan, supra
note 11, at 2331-37; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81,95 (1985).
27. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2337; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105-06 (1994).
28. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2339.
29. See id. at 2331.
30. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 1081.
31. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2264, 2344.
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32
sional will or governmental balance. The Constitution not only pits power
against power but law against politics, so as better to produce sound re-
sponses to complex problems. More narrowly, scholars have argued that the
platitudes about the president fail to hold up in reality. White House in-
volvement is insufficiently systematic and transparent to generate
accountability or defy faction.33 Very little is known about general White
House involvement. It is ad hoc, as it must be, because the president realisti-
cally cannot get involved in every agency decision.34 It is ex parte, though it
need not be, because the president often fails to disclose his role to the press
or the courts.3" If uneven and hidden, White House involvement is suscepti-
ble to misuse. It may operate to serve special interests rather than national
interests.
According to many, OIRA review is no less problematic. President
36Reagan introduced OIRA review of agency rule-making to downsize bu-
reaucratic government. By executive order, President Reagan established a
formalized process authorizing the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"), or, more particularly, OIRA, to evaluate major rule-making pro-
posals for cost-effectiveness and overall regulatory soundness.37 President
George H.W. Bush retained the OIRA review process, creating the Council
on Competitiveness in Vice President Dan Quayle's office to oversee it.3 8
President Clinton also adopted the OIRA review process, though he abol-
ished the Council on Competitiveness. But President Clinton justified the
process in a novel way, as part of an effort to reinvent government rather
than to reduce government. By the time President George W. Bush arrived,
preserving OIRA review was a foregone conclusion.40
Scholars have argued that OIRA review in practice does not serve its as-
serted purpose of improving rationality and coordination but rather imposes
32. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 520 (1987) (dis-
cussing whether presidential control fails to respect the system of divided powers); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 457
(1987) (arguing that presidential control fails to respect congressional assignment of regulatory
responsibilities); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967-68
(1997) (arguing that presidential control fails to respect constitutional balance between law and
politics).
33. See Bressman, supra note 12, at 504-15; Farina, supra note 1, at 185.
34. See Croley, supra note 3, at 832.
35. See Bressman, supra note 12, at 507-10; see also Peter M. Shane, Political Accountabil-
ity in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 161,209 (1995).
36. Presidents Ford and Carter played early roles in the development of centralized White
House review. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CI. L. REV. 1, 14(1995).
37. Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
38. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2281.
39. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 2006).
40. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).
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"structural and institutional biases against regulation."' Some emphasize that
OIRA has neither the staff nor the time to perform review in an adequate
manner.42 Others also contend that OIRA review occurs too late in the rule-
making process to offer meaningful input.43 In addition, some argue that
OIRA review is not an open process but a secretive conduit for regulated
entities.4" Furthermore, critics argue that OIRA gets involved on a partial,
skewed basis-only when costs justify less stringent regulation but not
when benefits justify more stringent regulation, only when regulations in-
crease restrictions but not when they reduce them, and only in cases of
agency action and not in cases of agency inaction.4 ' Thus, critics contend
that OIRA review in practice serves as a cost-based veto that merely inhibits
or delays regulations.
B. The White House Experience
Legal scholars have attempted to evaluate the theoretical debate by
measuring the actual effect of White House involvement on agency deci-
sion-making. These scholars effectively ask whether White House
involvement enhances agency legitimacy, as advocates contend, or fails to
provide a sophisticated or workable model of control, as critics fear. Profes-
sor Steven Croley performed a quantitative analysis of OIRA review of
agency rule-making from 1981 to 2000, focusing particularly on EPA rule-
making.46 Dean Elena Kagan gathered qualitative responses about broader
White House involvement in agency decision-making from her experience
in the White House and from high-level officials within the Clinton admini-
stration.47 These scholars ask the right questions about White House
involvement, but, as we show, they do so in limited contexts.
41. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 7 (emphasis omitted); id. at 3-5; see also E. Donald
Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly
and What President Clinton Should Do about It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175-81 (1994);
David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The
Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DuKE L.J. 963, 1006-08 (2001); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture
Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IowA L. REV. 1, 14 (1994).
43. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1986); Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 36, at 16.
44. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 Am.
U. L. REV. 535, 551 n.94 (1987); Morrison, supra note 43, at 1067; Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift
of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rule-
making under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 28-40 (1984).
45. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 9-17.
46. See Croley, supra note 3, at 846-70.
47. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2289-97.
[Vol. 105:47
Inside the Administrative State
1. OIRA Review
Croley collected several sources of data on OIRA review from 1981 to
482000. The Regulatory Information Service Center ("RISC"), an office
within the General Services Administration, maintains a computer log of
every rule that OIRA reviews. Croley consulted the RISC log primarily to
49identify which rules changed after OIRA reviewed them. Croley also ex-
amined the "meetings log" that OIRA maintains and makes publicly
available, as required by Executive Order 12,866.50 Although Croley mainly
performed a quantitative analysis of these sources of data, he informed that
analysis with conversations with high-level OIRA personnel.5'
Using the OIRA data, Croley substantiated many of the claims favoring
the presidential control model. First, Croley concluded that "the White
House has the institutional capacity to undertake meaningful review of
agency rules"5 2 OIRA "seems to concentrate on a manageable number of
rules."53 Furthermore, OIRA receives assistance from other White House
offices to make up for gaps in available resources.4 In addition, OIRA re-
duces review costs by encouraging specialization among reviewers 5
Second, Croley concluded that "White House review appears to be at
least partially technocratic and at any rate not ad hoc. 56 In performing re-
view, OIRA adheres to principles of cost-benefit analysis.57 Although "there
is room for the White House to put values on regulatory costs or benefits in
such a way as to advance its own political agenda," the structure of OIRA
review constitutes an obstacle to such a result.58 The OIRA staff members
are the ones who actually conduct cost-benefit analyses. Because they are
civil service members, relatively immune to changes in political leadership,
they provide a bulwark against political "corruption."59 The OIRA Adminis-
trator merely serves as a conduit between the career staff and the White
House rather than as "the White House's political tool who massages
48. In his analysis, Croley focused particularly on the Clinton years because Executive Order
12,866, while maintaining the essential features of Reagan-Bush OIRA review, also increased the
transparency of the process. Croley, supra note 3, at 840. By better exposing the workings of the
process, Executive Order 12,866 created a "best case" for study. Id.
49. Id. at 843.
50. Id. at 844.
51. Id. at 845 (acknowledging conversations with "the Branch Chiefs of each of the divisions
of OIRA, an Acting Administrator, and especially the Administrator of OIRA during most of the
Clinton era, Sally Katzen").
52. Id. at 873.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 874.
59. Id.
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cost-benefit numbers to advance political ends." 6 Nor do political appoint-
61ees from other White House offices "strong-arm" the OIRA reviewers.
Although such officials often are present at OIRA meetings, there is no cor-
relation between their presence at such meetings and changes in agency
rules.62
Third, Croley found little evidence that the White House used the review
process to deliver regulatory benefits to favored interests. Rather, he found
that "OIRA will hold meetings to discuss rules under review with any out-
side party who requests a meeting."6 Moreover, Croley found that "the type
of interest group in attendance at an OIRA meeting does not predict whether
the rule that is the subject of that meeting will be changed during the review
,,61process. If the White House used the OIRA review process "as a cover to
benefit politically powerful groups," it would be more likely to change a rule
when such groups raised objections in meetings.6 But this was not the case.
Likewise, it would be more likely to change a rule when it was the kind of
rule to which narrow interests raised objections-that is to say an economi-
67cally significant rule. But this was not the case, either. Because the White
House is no more or less likely to change a rule based on interest-group in-
68volvement or economic significance, it does not appear to play favoites.
Finally, while Croley determined that OIRA review does not appear to
favor particular groups, he found that it does appear to concentrate on envi-
ronmental rules. 69 Thus, OIRA review seems to focus on areas of White
House interest or expertise. 0 Croley concluded that OIRA review does im-
pose a political imprint on agency rule-making. But, he observed, this
imprint is not necessarily a negative as long as it is "substantive and even-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 874-75. Croley made this finding although his data did not include information on
the direction of the change that OIRA sought-i.e., whether the change made the regulation more or
less burdensome for regulated entities and more or less protective of human health and the environ-
ment.
64. Id. at 874.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 875.
67. Id.
68. Id. Croley acknowledged the possibility that regulatory favoritism might occur outside
the OIRA review process, but he discounted it. He noted that OIRA review is the easiest if not the
exclusive mechanism for private groups to gain White House access. Id. at 880. Even if narrow
groups reach other White House offices, they must still persuade those offices to influence OIRA
review. Id.
69. Id. at 875.
70. Id.
[Vol. 105:47
Inside the Administrative State
handed."7' OIRA does not "opportunistically eviscerate whichever rules
happen to generate opposition among politically important constituencies. 72
Croley concluded that "White House review of agency rule-making
probably is a welcome development in administrative governance.' 73 Al-
though many of the data are susceptible to differing interpretations, they "go
farther to assuage fears about presidential involvement in rule-making than
they do to accentuate those fears. 74 Croley acknowledged room for im-
provement in OIRA review, particularly as to transparency.75 But he found
76little reason for alarm in the picture presented.
2. General White House Involvement
Unlike Croley, Kagan did not set out to perform a quantitative empirical
analysis. Rather, she intended to describe and defend a novel vision of
presidential control: "By the close of the Clinton Presidency, a distinctive
form of administration and administrative control-call it 'presidential ad-
ministration'-had emerged, at the least augmenting, and in significant
respects subordinating, other modes of bureaucratic governance." 77 To build
the case for presidential administration, Kagan relied on her own recollec-
tions as Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy and as
Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council, as well as interviews with
other high-level officials in the Clinton White House, including the OIRA
Administrator, the Senior Advisor to the President for Policy and Strategy,
and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy.78 She also inter-
viewed several individuals outside the White House: the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division in the Department of Justice, the Deputy
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, and the Deputy Secre-
tary for the Department of Health and Human Services.79
71. Id. at 883.
72. Id. at 875. Although Croley found support in his findings for presidential control, he
noted that some of his findings could be marshaled against presidential control. For example, oppo-
nents might assert that OIRA review is not transparent but merely "translucent" because only a
relatively small number of rules are ever subject to meetings and all other contacts are off the re-
cord. Id. at 878.
73. Id. at 879.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 882 ("[I]n the light of available facts about White House review of agency rule-
making during the past two decades, and during the Clinton era most especially, it seems that some
of the common criticisms of expanded White House oversight are misguided.").
77. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2250.
78. Id. at 2297 n.213 (noting personal participation); id. at 2289 n.174 (interview with Sally
Katzen, OIRA Administrator); id. at 2296 n.208 (interview with Rahm Emanuel, Senior Advisor to
the President for Policy and Strategy); id. (interview with Bruce N. Reed, Assistant to the President
for Domestic Policy).
79. ld. at 2294 n.193 (interview with Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division in the Department of Justice); id. at 2297 n.213 (interview with William Schultz,
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What she documented were notable innovations. In addition to maintain-
ing OIRA review, President Clinton began issuing pre-regulatory directives
in the form of official memoranda to executive branch agency heads con-
ceming the substance of particular regulatory policies.'s Kagan found that
the use of directives had discernible effects on agency decision-making.
First, it altered the substance of agency policies rather than simply "rat-
ify[ing] initiatives that the agencies would have taken independently."'"
Second, the use of directives was particularly official and overt, and, there-
fore, likely more effective than the other means that the president possesses
82for influencing agency action . Thus, the use of directives made "presiden-
tial intervention in regulatory matters ever more routine and agency
acceptance of this intervention ever more ready."83
In addition to the use of directives, President Clinton began issuing post-
regulatory statements that announced publicly his personal ownership of
agency policies.8 Whether or not he previously had ordered the actions,
"[i]n event after event, speech after speech, Clinton claimed ownership of
administrative actions, presenting them to the public as his own-as the
product of his values and decisions. 85 Kagan found that the practice of
86ownership or "appropriation" had three effects on agency decision-making.
First, it constituted a kind of backstop for actions that were not yet final,
81
ensuring that they would go forward. Second, it gave White House officials
an incentive to "participate actively" in developing administrative policy "to
feed the schedule of presidential announcements." 88 Finally, it conveyed the
message that the agencies themselves belonged to the president: "these were
his agencies; he was responsible for their actions; and he was due credit for
their successes.8 9
Kagan concluded that "presidential administration"-which consists of
OIRA review, presidential directives, and presidential appropriation-
improves the accountability of agency decision-making. Presidential ad-
ministration enhances accountability by increasing the transparency and
responsiveness of agency decision-making. 9° As for transparency, presiden-
tial administration itself is overt, with official memoranda and public
Deputy Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration); id. (interview with Kevin Thurm,
Deputy Secretary for the Department of Health and Human Services).
80. Id. at 2290-99.
81. Id. at 2297.
82. Id. at 2299.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2300.
86. Id. at 2301.
87. Id. at 2301-02.
88. Id. at 2302.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2331-32. Kagan acknowledged that presidential administration did not extend to
environmental and other regulatory areas. See id. at 2308 n.254.
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announcements. 9' Furthermore, the president himself is particularly visible
in his actions: a single actor, with distinct "personality," subject to continu-
92
ous media attention. As for responsiveness, the president is elected by a
national constituency and therefore "is likely to consider, in setting the di-
rection of administrative policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the
general public, rather than merely parochial interests.' '93
Kagan further concluded that presidential administration enhances the
"effectiveness" of agency decision-making. By effectiveness, Kagan meant
that presidential administration facilitated the general "cost-effectiveness,
consistency, and rational priority-setting" of agency decision-making-
attributes often associated with OIRA review.94 Moreover, she meant that
presidential administration intensified the vigor with which agencies insti-
tuted change. 95 The need for presidential "expedition, energy, and change"
occurs because of the substantial risk otherwise that an "inert bureaucracy
encased in an inert political system [would] grind inflexibly, in the face of
new opportunities and challenges, toward (at best) irrelevance or (at worst)
real harm. 96
3. Limitations
Although Croley and Kagan have enriched the debate, they have con-
ducted empirical investigations that are limited in their descriptive
contribution and normative force. The reason is that they, in significant re-
spect, have assumed a premise about White House intervention that should
be at the heart of the debate. They have assumed that the activities that they
studied--OIRA review, presidential directives, and presidential appropria-
tion-reflect an accurate picture of presidential control. But Croley and
Kagan have examined the messages that the White House intended to send
without considering the messages that the agencies actually received.
To gauge the practice of presidential control, we looked to agency offi-
cials, who were on the receiving end of OIRA review and other White
House activities. Viewed narrowly, agency officials are positioned to con-
tribute more complete information about the practice of presidential control.
Indeed, agency officials are positioned to contribute particularly construc-
tive information, confirming or countering the White House experience.
Kagan herself supports this point. She acknowledged that the agency
91. Id. at 2333.
92. Id. at 2332.
93. Id. at 2335.
94. Id. at 2339-40 (describing ways in which OIRA review advances the "technocratic val-
ues" of eliminating inconsistencies and redundancies, rational priority-setting, and adhering to
general regulatory standards).
95. Id. at 2339 (arguing that presidential administration spurred in agencies "the capacity
and willingness to adopt, modify, or revoke regulations, with a fair degree of expedition, to solve
perceived national problems").
96. Id. at 2342, 2344.
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officials whom she interviewed offered different assessments of presidential
involvement in agency decision-making than did the White House officials.97
Even her limited sample suggests that the agency perspective is relevant if
not essential to evaluating the theoretical debate about presidential control.
Of course, the agency perspective is relevant only to the extent that it
does not reflect inherent bias against presidential control. Because presiden-
tial control impedes agency autonomy, agency officials might reject it out of
hand-whether or not it promotes the values important to democratic gov-
ernance. But this concern also applies to White House officials. Because
presidential control enhances presidential control, White House officials
might embrace it reflexively." The risk of bias is worth noting-on both
sides. It cannot be determinative, however, without foreclosing empirical
analysis. As Croley found, even "objective" sources of data, like OIRA
documents, require interpretation, for which the views of OIRA personnel
are useful. 9  If empirical analysis is to occur, the accompanying risk of bias
is worth tolerating. At the same time, the risk of bias counsels in favor of
including the agency perspective, not excluding it. The agency perspective
operates as a check on the White House perspective and vice versa.
In any event, we do not claim that agency officials are experts as to
whether the presidential control model serves democratic values-and thus,
we did not solicit their opinions on matters of such high theory. Rather, we
asked them to describe and assess presidential control in terms of how it
occurred and how it affected their decison-making processes. They have
provided an account that is informative regardless of any larger implica-
tions.
II. THE AGENCY EXPERIENCE: SURVEY METHODOLOGY
This Part introduces a survey of political appointees, those subject to
Senate confirmation, at the EPA during the Bush I and Clinton administra-
tions. Because the survey only canvasses officials from one agency, and only
the most senior political appointees at that agency, it cannot claim to capture
the entire agency perspective. But some agency views are more likely to
shed light on presidential control than others. As the agency with the most
major rule-makings, the EPA provides the most opportunities for OIRA
review and broader White House involvement.) °°
97. See id. at 2297 n.213.
98. Although White House officials function in close proximity to the president, their deci-
sions may not better reflect presidential preferences than those of top political appointees in
agencies, who were selected by the president with knowledge that they would confront difficult
policy choices (and face Senate hearings). At a minimum, it is unclear which would better reflect
presidential preferences.
99. See Croley, supra note 3, at 845.
100. Id. at 872.
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A. The Respondents
The target population for the survey was the group of EPA presidential
appointees subject to Senate confirmation ("PASs") during the Bush I ad-
ministration (1989-1993) and the Clinton administration (1993-2001).
These appointees were the highest political managers in the agency, holding
positions including Administrator, Deputy Administrator, General Counsel,
and Assistant Administrator.' °' The target population included all EPA PASs
with the exception of the Inspector General, who is responsible for oversight
rather than policy-making. 1
2
To identify the individuals who served as EPA PASs during the relevant
periods, we compiled an initial appointee list from historical materials avail-
able from the EPA.' °3 We then verified the list derived from EPA historical
materials by comparing it to a second list that we compiled from other gov-
emnment sources.' °" Where written sources did not clarify the status of a
particular position or individual, we sought confirmation from survey re-
spondents who held positions that clearly qualified.
This process yielded a list of thirty-five individuals, fourteen from the
Bush I administration (although one individual from the Bush I administra-
tion is deceased), and twenty-one from the two Clinton administrations. Of
the population of thirty-four living PASs, we conducted interviews with
thirty (88% of the total). From the Bush I administration, we interviewed ten
of the thirteen living EPA PASs (77% of the total). From the two Clinton
administrations, we interviewed twenty of the twenty-one EPA PASs (95%
of the total).
101. The Assistant Administrators during the Bush I and Clinton administrations included the
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation, the Assistant Administrator for the
Office of Water, the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, and the Assistant
Administrator for International Affairs. In addition, the position of Assistant Administrator for the
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation existed for much of each administration.
102. We also excluded appointees who held over from the prior administration for two months
or less (e.g., from the Reagan administration to the Bush I administration) and career appointees
who held acting positions.
103. We identified the population of EPA presidential appointees during the Bush I and Clin-
ton administrations by first examining the lists of appointees available on a per-office basis from the
EPA history website, http://www.epa.gov/history/org/index.htm. From these lists, we compiled the
presidential appointees for January 1989 through January 2001.
104. In particular, we compiled a list of EPA positions for Executive Level I-IV presidential
appointee positions that require Senate confirmation. The source for this summary was the list of
presidential appointees published in the 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 editions of U.S. Government
Policy and Supporting Positions. See S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (Comm. Print 1992); H.R. COMM. ON
GOV'T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, 104TH CONG., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT-
ING POSITIONS (Comm. Print 1996); S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 106TH CONG., UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS (Comm. Print 2000); H.R. COMM. ON
GOV'T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, 108TH CONG., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SuP-
PORTING POSITIONS (Comm. Print 2004). We then identified the names of the individuals holding
these positions by examining the U.S. Government Manual for each year during January 1989
through January 2001. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS
ADMIN.. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1989/90 (1989).
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B. The Survey Instrument
We conducted interviews by telephone or in person using a survey in-
strument.'0 5 In it, we assured the respondents that their identities would
remain anonymous. We also offered the respondents the opportunity to de-
cline to participate or refuse to answer any question. We asked the
respondents to answer the questions based on their experience during their
tenure as EPA PASs during the relevant administration.' 6
The survey instrument contained 107 questions. The questions sought
information regarding the involvement of OIRA and other White House of-
fices in EPA rule-making, as opposed to other types of policy-making.
0 7
More specifically, the questions sought confirmation of the respondents'
EPA positions, as well as information regarding a variety of topics, includ-
ing: (1) the institutional capacity of OIRA to perform regulatory review; (2)
the effect of OIRA review; (3) the role of presidential directives and presi-
dential announcements in controlling agency regulatory activity; (4) the
effect of other White House involvement in agency rule-making; and (5) the
difference between White House involvement and alternative sources for
controlling agency decison-making (e.g., Congress and the judiciary). Most
questions asked respondents to rate on a several-point scale various state-
ments related to these and other topics. We provided respondents with an
opportunity to add narrative responses to these questions, as they chose.
Several questions sought only narrative responses.0
After we completed the interviews, we entered the data. For the quanti-
tative data, we made calculations to enable data analysis, including the
calculation of frequencies and weighted means to facilitate data comparison.
In addition, we analyzed the data to identify significant differences between
responses of the PASs from the Bush I and Clinton administrations-
recognizing that officials serving in administrations of different political
parties might generate different results.
105. See Presidential Control Survey (on file with authors).
106. See id. (requesting that the respondent "respond to each question based on your experi-
ence during your tenure at EPA").
107. The offices identified by EPA respondents were Chief of Staff, Legislative Affairs, Public
Liaison, Intergovernmental Liaison, Press Secretary (including Communications), White House
Counsel, Domestic Policy Counsel, National Economic Council, Political Affairs, Office of the Vice
President (including the Council on Competitiveness in the Bush I administration), Office of Policy
Development, Office of Management and Budget (other than OIRA), Council of Economic Advi-
sors, Council on Environmental Quality, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and the National Security Council. See id.
108. See, e.g., id. at Question 7 (asking "How often did the involvement of the White House
offices other than OIRA make up for gaps in the knowledge or available time of the O1RA staff?."
and providing a scale consisting of never, rarely, sometimes, often, always, and other).
109. See id. at Question 39 ("If your answer was OIRA, what aspects of the OIRA process
made it more representative of the public's views?"); id. at Question 40 ("If your answer was EPA,
what aspects of the EPA process made it more representative of the public's views?").
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III. THE AGENCY EXPERIENCE: SURVEY RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
This Part organizes the findings and conclusions of the EPA survey in a
manner that speaks to the agency legitimacy debate. Section A addresses a
question often skirted in the debate: as between OIRA and other White
House offices, which precisely is the source of presidential control? The
remaining sections confront the questions at the heart of the debate. Section
B concerns the extent to which OIRA review and broader White House in-
volvement improve regulatory efficacy. Section C concerns the extent to
which White House involvement enhances political accountability. Finally,
Section D discusses the extent to which White House involvement furthers
faction resistance.
We note upfront that we found very few differences in the answers of the
Bush I and Clinton respondents-a finding that is meaningful in and of it-
self."° When we found significant differences, they were of degree rather
than of direction: the respondents from one administration felt more or less
intensely about a proposition or felt that a particular activity occurred more
or less frequently, but the respondents did not occupy opposing ends of the
spectrum. " ' We discuss any differences between the Bush I and Clinton re-
spondents in our review of our findings below.
A. Sources of Presidential Control
Critical to a description and evaluation of presidential control is a
threshold question on which scholars rarely focus: Who is the source of
presidential control? More precisely, which entities in the executive branch
exert influence on agency decison-making? Scholars concentrate primarily
on OIRA and less on other White House offices. Moreover, scholars who
concentrate on OIRA suppose that it exerts considerable influence on
agency rule-making to the benefit (or detriment) of agency legitimacy. But
what if non-OIRA White House offices wield more influence in a given case
or across the board? In context, OIRA review might have a limited effect on
agency rule-making and make only a marginal contribution to agency le-
gitimacy. Scholars also rarely pause to examine whether OIRA and the
White House are competitors or complements.
110. To compare the Bush I and Clinton administration responses, independent samples t-tests
were conducted for each survey response. Of the 107 questions in the survey (plus sub-questions),
the Bush I and Clinton respondents offered answers that differed significantly only for fifteen ques-
tions: 4, 11, 12.c, 13, 27.d, 30, 45, 56.a, 69, 79, 81, 85, 89, 97, and 99. We discuss the differences
infra notes 112-190.
111. For example, although both the Bush I and Clinton respondents indicated that White
House offices other than OIRA were involved in EPA rule-making, the Bush I officials were slightly
less likely to state that other offices were involved. To compare the responses from the Bush I and
Clinton administrations to Question 4 ("Were White House offices other than OIRA involved in EPA
rulemaking?" with possible answers Yes (1), No (2), and Other), an independent samples t-test was
conducted. Bush I respondents scored significantly higher (M = 1.10, SD = .32) than did the Clinton
respondents ((M = 1.00, SD = .00) t(30) = -.1.402, p<.004 )). Presidential Control Survey, supra
note 105. Only Question II resulted in respondents signaling a difference of direction rather than
degree in their answers. We note the differences regarding Question II infra note 116.
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We asked questions concerning the relationship between OERA and the
other White House offices. Ninety-three percent of EPA respondents stated
that other White House offices were involved in agency rule-making, exactly
as many as who stated that OIRA was involved." 2 When asked about the ex-
tent of OIRA involvement as a general matter, 57% of respondents replied that
it was either moderate or heavy."' When asked the same question about other
White House offices, a roughly equivalent 60% said that it was either moder-
ate or heavy.' '4 Thus, when asked about OIRA and the White House
respectively, EPA respondents commented that each had substantial involve-
ment. When asked to compare which had more influence in EPA rule-makings
as a whole, 61% of respondents chose OIRA, while only 11% chose other
White House offices." 5 When asked specifically about relative influence in
rule-makings as to which both OIRA and other White House offices were
involved, respondents split-29% for OIRA and 36% for other White House
offices." 1
6
These data support a finding that OIRA and the White House are evenly
matched in terms of involvement in EPA rule-making, even when the two
112. Question 4 asked, "Were White House offices other than OIRA involved in EPA rule-
making?" with the possible answers: Yes (1), No (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the thirty
respondents was 1.03, with 93.3% responding Yes, 3.3% No, and 3.3% Other. In calculating the
weighted means for Question 4 and all other questions, we excluded the responses marked "Other."
Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105. For a comparison of the Bush I and Clinton responses,
see supra note I11.
113. Question 3 asked, "As a general matter, how extensive was the involvement of OIRA in
EPA rulemaking?" using a four-point scale: No Involvement (1), Only Slight Involvement (2), Mod-
erate Involvement (3), Heavy Involvement (4), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight
respondents was 3.75, with 0.0% responding No Involvement, 0.0% Only Slight Involvement,
14.3% Moderate Involvement, 42.9% Heavy Involvement, and 42.9% Other. Presidential Control
Survey, supra note 105.
114. Question 9 asked, "As a general matter, how extensive was the involvement of White
House offices other than OIRA in EPA rulemaking?" using a four-point scale: No Involvement (1),
Only Slight Involvement (2), Moderate Involvement (3), Heavy Involvement (4), and Other. The
weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.95, with 0.0% responding No Involvement,
21.4% Only Slight Involvement, 42.9% Moderate Involvement, 17.9% Heavy Involvement, and
17.9% Other. Id.
115. Question 10 asked, "As to all EPA rulemakings as a whole, which had more influence on
EPA regulatory activity?" with the possible answers: OIRA (1), Other White House Offices (2), and
Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.15, with 60.7% responding OIRA,
10.7% Other White House Offices, and 28.6% Other. Id.
116. Question II asked, "As to those rulemakings in which both OIRA and other White
House offices were involved, which had the most influence on EPA regulatory activity?" with the
possible answers: OIRA (1), Other White House Offices (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the
twenty-eight respondents was 1.56, with 28.6% responding OIRA, 35.7% Other White House Of-
fices, and 35.7% Other. Question 11 is the only question for which we found a significant difference
between the Bush I and Clinton EPA respondents and for which the difference reflected a different
direction in the response of the EPA respondents. To compare the responses from the Bush I and
Clinton administrations, an independent samples t-test was conducted. Bush I respondents scored
significantly higher (M = 2.00, SD = .00) than did the Clinton respondents ((M = 1.43, SD = .51)
t(28) = -.2.177, p<.000)), suggesting that most Bush I respondents believed that other White House
offices had the most influence on EPA regulatory activity, whereas most Clinton respondents be-
lieved that OIRA had the most influence on regulatory activity. Id. This difference may reflect the
influence of the Council on Competitiveness during the Bush I administration, but it is not possible
to determine the source of the difference from the data.
[Vol. 105:47
Inside the Administrative State
are involved in the same rule-making, but that OIRA exerts more influence
on the whole. And it is possible to conclude that scholars are correct, as a
descriptive matter, to focus on OIRA as the main source of presidential con-
trol. But such a conclusion fails to explain a strange phenomenon in the
data. For several of these questions, a large number of EPA respondents an-
swered "Other." When asked to rate the extent of OIRA involvement from
none to heavy, 43% chose "Other;" when asked to indicate the extent of
White House involvement from none to heavy, 18% chose "Other"; when
asked which had more influence as between OIRA and other White House
offices, 29% chose "Other"; and when asked which on the whole had more
influence when both were involved in an EPA rule-making, 36% chose
"Other.""11 7 Respondents expressed considerable hesitation in answering
these questions-and the reason is impossible to determine from the quanti-
tative data alone.
But the qualitative responses seem to explain why. Many EPA respon-
dents commented that the extent of OIRA involvement was neither slight
nor moderate nor heavy but "sporadic.""' Thus, one respondent remarked
that OIRA was "very involved in the things they got involved in [but] they
let most of it go by."' 9 Moreover, OIRA "focused on a small number of big
rules"' 20 -those that "they believed were more significant."' 21 Similarly,
many respondents reported that the White House was heavily involved in a
small number of big rules: the White House had "heavy involvement in
some rulemakings but hardly any or none in plenty of other rulemakings"
' 2
OIRA and the White House did not simply refrain from involvement in low-
cost rule-making. Rather, EPA respondents indicated that OIRA and the
White House also exhibited selective involvement within the category of
major or significant rule-makings (i.e., $100 million or over), as to which
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,866 authorized regulatory review.121
117. Supranotes 113-116.
118. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C008, response to
Question 3; see also id. at EPA Respondent B007, response to Question 9 (describing involvement
of White House offices other than OIRA as "episodic").
119. Id. at EPA Respondent C008, response to Question 3; see also id. EPA Respondent
B001, response to Question 9 ("It depended on particular rulemakings. On a qualitative scale-how
many rules did [OIRA] weigh in on-then slight [OIRA involvement]. For particular rules they
were involved in, then heavy [OIRA involvement].").
120. Id. at EPA Respondent C018, response to Question 3.
121. Id. at EPA Respondent B001, response to Question 3 (commenting that "[i]n rulemak-
ings [OIRA] believed were more significant, they'd be much more involved").
122. Id. at EPA Respondent C018, response to Question 9; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B002, response to Question 3 (observing that OIRA involvement was "[slometimes heavy, some-
times none at all").
123. Id. at EPA Respondent C008, response to Question 106 (commenting that the White
House was "selective in what they pick on .... there are 100 different things that [the EPA] does
with very little OIRA or [White House] involvement ... between 6 and 10 times a year, there is
inter-agency conflict or [issues that are] beyond-EPA-enough that the White House wants to touch
base with other offices ... OMB involvement in 15 [rulemakings], White House involvement in I or
2 [rulemakings], 6-10 times a year."); id. at EPA Respondent B006, response to Question 3 (noting
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More noteworthy than the relative frequency of OIRA and White
House involvement was the relative effect of such involvement on EPA
rule-making. EPA respondents indicated that OIRA and the White House
did not exert comparable influence. The White House had more influence
on the issues that arguably mattered most. Respondents stated that OIRA
had more influence on "day-to-day issues"; other White House offices had
more influence on "big picture" issues. "For issues of less political impact,
OIRA [had more influence]. But if you crossed a certain threshold ...
other White House offices would get involved .... It became high level
politics."'24 To further crystallize the point, one respondent commented, "If
asking who kind of mucked around in [rule-making] more, who got into
the real details, then OIRA. If asking about big ticket items and who won,
the other White House offices.12 5
EPA respondents also revealed that the White House offices contrib-
uted to a climate of internal combat and coalition-building in the
development of EPA rules. As many as nineteen White House offices were
involved in EPA rule-making.126 With respect to particular proposed rules,
these offices often were not on the same page. Rather, they competed for
influence over the content of those proposed rules, enlisting other offices,
the vice president, and even the president himself to mediate the disputes.
As one respondent commented, "Normal constituency groups-CEQ
[Council on Environmental Quality], the Vice President-were almost al-
ways on our side. [Others in the White House] were on the other side;
[still others] brokered the disagreement."1 27 Similarly, another commented
that "[Y]ou fight with another agency and hope to get White House offices
on your side--CEQ, CEA [Council of Economic Advisors]-against DOE
[Department of Energy]... then DOE tries as well."''2 Finally, one offered
that "[t]here was some inter-agency conflict that the White House had to
mediate because it got so ugly.'
'29
that OIRA "didn't get involved at all on rulemakings under $100 million. They were very involved
in some [rulemakings], not involved in others.").
124. Id. at EPA Respondent C009, response to Question 11; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B007, response to Question 11 (noting that where the president had made "specific commitments"
during the campaign, "we were able to override" OIRA).
125. Id. at EPA Respondent C022, response to Question 11; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B002, response to Question 11 (stating that "[w]e used the Competitiveness Council to roll OIRA").
126. See supra note 107.
127. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C022, response to
Question 8; see also id. at EPA Respondent B004, response to Question 7 ("We had to fight some
battles twice.").
128. Id. at EPA Respondent C008, response to Question 106; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B007, response to question 7 (stating that White House offices other than OIRA "provided different
roles").
129. Id. at EPA Respondent C006, response to Question 106. Presidential directives, to the
extent they exist with respect to EPA rule-making, also may play a role in coalition building. As a
respondent commented, "EPA helped orchestrate the presidential directive to calm waters with other
agencies as well as OIRA." Id. at EPA Respondent C022, response to Question 70.e. Another re-
spondent stated, "A presidential directive was a way to get other agencies to do what we needed
them to do, consistent with our priorities." Id. at EPA Respondent C002, response to Question 70.a.
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EPA respondents also indicated that OIRA frequently was in the middle
of the inter-agency conflict. The EPA used other White House offices to
combat OIRA, and other offices and agencies used OIRA to combat the
EPA. A respondent commented, "[W]hen you had a big fight with OIRA,
that's when you brought in the other [White House] offices. Then it becomes
who wins."3 Similarly, one stated that it was "[n]ot always clear whether
OIRA was carrying other offices' water."'3' Another remarked that on some
occasions OIRA "helped to shield EPA from being battered by other [White
House] offices, even though dealing with [OIRA] was excruciating."'32
In light of the qualitative responses, the data appear to support four find-
ings. First, although OIRA was involved in more EPA rule-makings than
were other White House offices, OIRA and other White House offices both
were involved in EPA rule-making on an uneven or unsystematic basis. Sec-
ond, the White House offices had at least as much, and perhaps more,
influence on EPA rule-makings because they often had more influence on
weightier issues. Third, the White House offices routinely disagreed with
each other on the substance of proposed rules, creating a complicated bar-
gaining dynamic among interested government players-OIRA, other White
House offices, other federal agencies, and the EPA. Finally, White House
offices (including OIRA) rather than the president himself were the ones
most often involved in agency decison-making.
We offer two conclusions based on these findings. First, presidential
control is more complex than scholars generally have acknowledged. White
House offices other than OIRA play a substantial role in EPA rule-making,
exerting particular influence on high-profile or high-stakes issues. In addi-
tion, they may increase the level of antagonism and the need for alliances in
rule-making. They also may change the unit of analysis for purposes of as-
sessing agency legitimacy. The issue becomes whether White House
officials (including those at OIRA)-not the president himself-are, for
example, responsive to the public or resistant to faction."' Other White
House offices aside, OIRA remains important. It exerts substantial influence
on day-to-day issues and participates in coalition-building among White
House offices and interested agencies. But it is perhaps less important than
scholars believe. In any event, scholars must account for the interplay be-
tween other White House offices and OIRA to present an accurate
description of presidential control.
130. Id. at EPA Respondent C008, response to Question 10.
131. Id. at EPA Respondent C001, response to Question 11; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B006, response to Question 4 ("[I1t was not just the White House but other agencies, like the De-
partment of Energy, who would also be at the table and OIRA would serve as chair and it would be
empowered to resolve disagreements.").
132. Id. at EPA Respondent C015, response to Question 106; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B002, response to question II ("[The] Competitiveness Council was much more sympathetic to
what we wanted to do [than OIRA].").
133. But see Kagan, supra note 11, at 2338 (arguing that involvement of White House staff
rather than the president himself in controlling agencies does not change the analysis or the conclu-
sion concerning political accountability).
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Second, presidential control, as structured, is selective in its focus. EPA
respondents reported that OIRA and White House officials took an interest in
certain rule-makings more than others. Perhaps OIRA mainly concentrated on
rules involving over $100 million, even when it could have focused on lesser-
cost ones. But EPA respondents seemed to suggest that OIRA chose which
among those $100 million-plus rules received sustained attention. This raises
a concern about whether White House involvement, whether exercised by
OIRA or other offices, is too idiosyncratic to constitute a model of agency
legitimacy.'3 4 The findings of this study alone cannot determine whether
White House involvement is sufficiently systematic or organized for pur-
poses of promoting, for example, political accountability or faction
resistance. Nor do advocates of presidential control claim that it reaches
every agency action or even every important agency action.' Indeed, there
is reason to believe that it cannot or should not. The president simply has
too many responsibilities, and OIRA and the other White House offices have
too few resources, to reach even every major agency decision, whether or
not they possessed the requisite expertise and authority for that purpose.'36
It nevertheless is reasonable to expect a method to the madness. Beyond
the broad standards of the executive orders, EPA respondents only pointed
to the professional or political interest of particular OIRA staffers or White
House policy advisors as affecting the existence or intensity of OIRA or
White House involvement in rule-makings. More may be required to ensure
that presidential control attaches to matters of public importance, as well as
political or professional salience. It is not a sufficient response to say that
the president gets involved in agency decison-making when he wants the
public to understand that he is responsible for particular agency policies or
rules. Even if such behavior promotes accountability on a limited basis, the
concern is that it may not promote rationality in a systematic way, as a
model of agency decison-making should.
B. Regulatory Efficacy
Scholars debate whether OIRA review improves the efficacy of agency
rule-making. Efficacy means not only whether OIRA review enhances cost-
effectiveness but also whether it promotes what might be called intra-agency
coherence and inter-agency coordination. Intra-agency coherence includes
avoiding inconsistencies, reducing redundancies, and eliminating unin-
tended consequences between or among the regulations of a particular
agency. Inter-agency coordination focuses on preventing overlaps or resolv-
ing conflicts between or among the regulations of different agencies.
134. See id. at 2308 (noting that President Clinton, in exercising his public control techniques,
did so "haphazardly" and in accordance with "his substantive interests as well as the structure and
organization of the White House").
135. E.g., id. at 2307.
136. For arguments that the president lacks the institutional capacity or expertise to exert
systematic control of agency decision-making, see Bressman, supra note 12, at 511-15, and Farina,
supra note 1, at 185.
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To test issues of regulatory efficacy, we asked questions about the gen-
eral functions of OIRA review. As an initial matter, EPA respondents stated
that, more often than not, the workload of the OIRA staff was sufficiently
limited and the OIRA staff was sufficiently knowledgeable to provide mean-
ingful review of EPA regulations (see Table A).
37
TABLE A
OIRA INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
30.
28 - EThe OIRA staff was sufficiently knowledgeable to provide
meaningful review of EPA regulations.
26-
24 - COThe workload of OIRA was sufficiently limited to enable the
staff to provide meaningful review of EPA regulations.
22-
, 20-
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2 -- 4%------
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But more than 60% of respondents said that OIRA involvement never or
rarely helped to avoid inconsistencies, reduce redundancies, or eliminate
unintended consequences between or among EPA regulations (see Table
B). 13' By contrast, more than 60% of respondents stated that OIRA review
137. Question 2.a asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "[tlhe OIRA staff
was sufficiently knowledgeable to provide meaningful review of EPA regulations" using a five-point
scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True (4), Always True (5), and
Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.77, with 0% responding Never
True, 3.6% Rarely True, 28.6% Sometimes True, 46.4% Often True, 14.3% Always True, and 7.1%
Other. Question 2.b asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "[tjhe workload of OIRA
was sufficiently limited to enable the staff to provide meaningful review of EPA regulations" using
the same five-poin scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.0, with 3.6%
responding Never True, 14.3% Rarely True, 46.4% Sometimes True, 14.3% Often True, 3.6% Al-
ways True, and 17.9% Other. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105.
138. Question 12.a asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "ORA involve-
ment helped to avoid inconsistencies between or among EPA regulations" using a five-point scale:Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True (4), Always True (5), and Other.
The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.1, with 17.9% responding Never True,
53.6% Rarely True, 10.7% Sometimes True, 10.7% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 7.1% Other.
Question 12.b asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "OIRA involvement helped to
reduce redundancies between or among EPA regulations" using the same five-point scale. The
weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.8, with 35.7% responding Never True, 32.1 %
Rarely True, 25.0% Sometimes True, 0.0% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 7.1% Other. Ques-
tion 12.c asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "OIRA involvement helped to
eliminate unintended consequences of EPA regulations." The weighted mean of the twenty-eight
respondents was 2.3, with 3.6% responding Never True, 64.3% Rarely True, 17.9% Sometimes
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frequently helped to coordinate EPA regulations with the regulations of
other agencies."
TABLE B
OIRA INVOLVEMENT HELPED TO AVOID INCONSISTENCIES
BETWEEN OR AMONG EPA REGULATIONS
28
26
24
22
20
1 8
16 59%
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Never True Rarely True Sometimes True Often True Always True Other
We also posed questions specifically about the cost-benefit aspects of
OIRA review. (We include these questions in this discussion of whether
OIRA review improves regulatory efficacy although they also pertain to
whether OIRA review enhances political accountability and faction resis-
tance.) When asked how often OIRA focused on cost-benefit analysis rather
than the substance of regulatory provisions, approximately 70% of EPA re-
spondents stated that OIRA often or always did.' 4° When asked what kind of
changes OIRA sought after performing cost-benefit analysis, 89% of re-
spondents stated that OIRA never or only rarely sought changes that would
True, 3.6% Often True, 3.3% Always True, and 7.1% Other. Question 12.c was one of the few ques-
tions for which there were significant differences between the answers provided by the Bush I and
Clinton respondents. To compare the responses from the Bush I and Clinton administrations, an
independent samples t-test was conducted. The Bush I respondents scored significantly higher (M =
2.56, SD = 1.13) in response to Question 12.c than did the Clinton respondents ((M = 2.24, SD =
.562) t(28) = -.974, p<.044 )). Nevertheless, the "never" and "rarely" answers together comprised
more than half of all responses from both the Bush I and Clinton respondents. Id.
139. Question 12.d asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "O1RA involve-
ment helped to coordinate EPA regulations with the regulations of other federal agencies" using a
five-point scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True (4), Always True
(5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.0, with 10.7% responding
Never True, 14.3% Rarely True, 39.3% Sometimes True, 21.4% Often True, 7.1% Always True, and
7.1% Other. Id.
140. Question 14 asked, "How often did OIRA involvement in EPA rulemaking focus on the
adequacy of the cost-benefit analysis of a regulation, as opposed to the provisions of the regulation
itself?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and
Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 4.1, with 0.0% responding Never,
3.6% Rarely, 7.1% Sometimes, 46.4% Often, 21.4% Always, and 17.9% Other. Id.
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make a regulation more protective of human health and the environment. 4'
In addition, 75% said that OIRA often or always sought changes that would
make a regulation less protective of human health and the environment.
When asked to what extent OIRA sought changes that would make a regula-
tion less burdensome for regulated entities, 89% answered often or always.
When asked to what extent OIRA sought changes that would make a regula-
tion more burdensome for regulated entities, 89% answered never or rarely.
We examined not only the types of interests that OIRA advocates but the
time horizon that it considers.' 42 When asked what factors OIRA examined
as part of cost-benefit analysis, 71% of EPA respondents stated that OIRA
placed greater emphasis on short-term costs and benefits rather than long-
term costs and benefits. By contrast, 75% said that the EPA placed a greater
emphasis on long-term costs and benefits, and a comparable number said
that OIRA and the EPA often or always disagreed on the weight given short-
term costs and benefits as opposed to long-term costs and benefits.
Finally, we asked questions relevant to the OIRA career civil servants
who actually performed the regulatory review. All EPA respondents were
aware that O1RA staff members below the OIRA Administrator level were
civil servants, not political appointees. '41 When asked how often the OIRA
141. Question 27.a asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "OIRA sought
changes that would make a regulation more protective of human health and the environment" using
a five-point scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True (4), Always True
(5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.4, with 57.1% responding
Never True, 32.1% Rarely True, 3.6% Sometimes True, 0.0% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and
7.1% Other. Question 27.b asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "OIRA sought
changes that would make a regulation less protective of human health and the environment" using
the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 4.0, with 0.0%
responding Never True, 0.0% Rarely True, 17.9% Sometimes True, 53.6% Often True, 21.4% Al-
ways True, and 7.1% Other. Question 27.c asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion
"OIRA sought changes that would make a regulation less burdensome for regulated entities." The
weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 4.4, with 0.0% responding Never True, 0.0%
Rarely True, 7.1%, Sometimes True, 46.4% Often True, 42.9% Always True, and 3.6% Other. Ques-
tion 27.d asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "OIRA sought changes that would
make a regulation more burdensome for regulated entities." The weighted mean of the twenty-eight
respondents was 1.4, with 67.9% responding Never True, 21.4% Rarely True, 7.1%, Sometimes
True, 0.0% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 3.6% Other. Question 27.d was another of the few
for which there was a significant difference in the answers between the Bush I and Clinton admini-
stration respondents. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I respondents
scored significantly lower (M = 1.11, SD = .33) in response to Question 27.d than did the Clinton
respondents ((M = 1.50, SD = .71) t(28) = 1.55,p<.003)). Id.
142. Question 29 asked, "As between short-term and long-term regulatory costs and benefits,
which did OIRA place a greater emphasis on?" with the possible answers: Short-Term (1), Long-
Term (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.1, with 71.4% re-
sponding Short-Term, 7.1% Long-Term, and 21.4% Other. Question 30 asked respondents "As
between short-term and long-term regulatory costs and benefits, which did EPA place a greater
emphasis on?" The weighted mean of the 28 respondents was 1.9, with 3.6% responding Short-
Term, 75.0% Long-Term, and 21.4% Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate
that Bush I respondents scored significantly lower (M = 1.83, SD = .41) in response to Question 30
than did the Clinton respondents ((M = 2.00, SD = .00) t(28) = 1.706, p<.000)). Id.
143. Question 49 asked, "During your time at EPA, did you know that the OIRA staff below
the OIRA Administrator level consisted of career civil servants?" with the possible answers: Yes (1),
No (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.0, with 100.0% re-
sponding Yes. Id.
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career staff exercised independence from the political control of the OIRA
Administrator or other White House political appointees, 39% of EPA re-
spondents answered sometimes, 21% answered often, and 11% answered
always. By contrast, 18% answered rarely or never.144
These data support three findings concerning the functions of OIRA re-
view. First, OIRA review did not enhance intra-agency coherence, although
it had the institutional capacity to perform this role at least for the rule-
makings on which it chose to focus. EPA respondents suggested that OIRA
seldom exercised that capacity to reduce inconsistencies, avoid redundan-
cies, or eliminate unintended consequences between or among EPA
regulations. OIRA more regularly helped to coordinate EPA regulations
with the regulations of other agencies. But even here, the mean score is not
overwhelming: according to respondents, only occasionally did OIRA im-
prove inter-agency coordination.
Second, OIRA review focused almost exclusively on the cost side of cost-
benefit analysis. As one respondent explained, OIRA was "single-minded in
their focus on monetizing the benefits of our rules and minimizing the
costs.' ' 145 As a result, OIRA disregarded substantive agency positions. Indeed,
one Clinton-era respondent noted that OIRA was so single-minded in its regu-
latory cost reductions that it also "pushed positions on rules [that were] not in
keeping with the President's views.', 146 Another Clinton-era respondent re-
marked that "the civil servants in OIRA, who had been there largely since
the Reagan Administration ... were more conservative and suspicious of
EPA regulations than the political appointees,' ' 147 and one Bush-era respon-
dent stated that the "entrenched career people [] wouldn't listen to their
political bosses."'
48
Third, OIRA review tilted regulations in a particular direction. OIRA
routinely sought to reduce regulatory burdens, and it only infrequently
sought to strengthen environmental protections. Furthermore, OIRA not
only focused on costs and benefits but certain costs and benefits. That is,
OIRA routinely focused on the short-term costs and benefits of EPA regula-
tions rather than the long-term costs and benefits. This focus favors
regulated entities to the extent that they bear costs in the short term and
144. Question 50 asked, "How often did the OIRA career staff exercise independence from
the political control of the OIRA Administrator or other White House appointees?" using a five-
point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted
mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.2, with 10.7% responding Never, 7.1% Rarely, 39.3%
Sometimes, 21.4% Often, 10.7% Always, and 10.7% Other. Id.
145. Id. at EPA Respondent C002, response to Question 51; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B009, response to Question 40 (commenting that EPA "took the benefits of the regulation more
seriously than the White House, [which was] more focused on the costs").
146. Id. at EPA Respondent C024, response to Question 51.
147. Id. at EPA Respondent C023, response to Question 106.
148. Id. at EPA Respondent B002, response to Question 106; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B006, response to Question 51 (stating that "90% of the decisions were made by career staff not by
political appointees" and that "a lot of deference [was] given to recommendations and views of the
career staff"). These findings are also relevant to whether White House involvement facilitates po-
litical accountability. See infra Section mH.D.
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environmental benefits accrue in the long term. EPA respondents made the
point more directly: OIRA consistently sought changes that relaxed burdens
on regulated entities.
We conclude that OIRA review may not be achieving its purported func-
tion of promoting regulatory efficacy. As critics warn, OIRA review may not
advance intra-agency coherence and inter-agency coordination at all or well
enough.49 Furthermore, OIRA may be approaching cost-benefit analysis in
a particular way. Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,866 direct OIRA to con-
sider cost-benefit analysis in reviewing proposed agency rules.'50 But the
best use of cost-benefit analysis-that is, the use that appeals to both De-
mocrats and Republicans-is as an articulated and rational metric for
checking agency regulation. OIRA instead may be using cost-benefit analy-
sis to impose its own normative preference for deregulation. In the words of
one EPA respondent, OIRA may be "focused on narrowing our authority to
regulate. ' Alternatively, OIRA may be focused on altering the mix of areas
in which agencies impose regulatory costs (for example, between or among
food quality, worker safety, environmental protection and other concerns)
rather than reducing regulatory costs across the board. That is, OIRA may
be focused on broader governmental priority or agenda setting. The diffi-
culty with this positive explanation is that the inter-agency coordination
marks do not strongly support it.
We further conclude that the independence of the OIRA career staff may
be problematic. EPA respondents tended to confirm that the OIRA career
staff exercise judgment apart from that of the OIRA Administrator and the
president. Proponents of OIRA review believe that the OIRA career staff use
their independence as a safeguard against political corruption of otherwise
rational regulation. Many EPA respondents appear to believe that the OIRA
career staff use that room to substitute their own institutional biases against
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regulation. If so, opponents of OIRA review are right to caution that the
career staff may not enhance regulatory efficacy (defined as more than sim-
ply deregulation).5 3 At the same time, the staff may eliminate a principal
justification for OIRA career staff independence.
149. E.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 3-5; Elliott, supra note 41, at 175-8 1.
150. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp.
2006).
151. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C002, response to
Question 51; see also id. at EPA Respondent B014, response to Question 34(a) (noting that OIRA
was "pursuing a national policy of deregulation" and of "minimum costs of regulation").
152. E.g., id. at EPA Respondent C023, response to Question 106 ("It did seem that the civil
servants in OIRA, who had been there largely since the Reagan Administration and Bush I, were
more conservative and suspicious of EPA regulations than the political appointees."); id. at EPA
Respondent C006, response to Question 51 ("They were holdovers from the Reagan Administra-
tions, for crying out loud ... they did what they thought they were supposed to be doing for the
regulation instead of what the political managers wanted."); id. at EPA Respondent B002, response
to question 106 (stating that with OIRA, "[We were dealing with] entrenched career people who
wouldn't listen to their political bosses.").
153. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 3-5; Morrison, supra note 43, at 1065.
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We note, however, that our findings are consistent with a more "neutral"
account. OIRA may perform cost-benefit analysis as it does to counteract
instances of agency capture or regulatory excess. The idea is that agencies
favor pro-regulatory constituencies and pro-regulatory policies. Thus, OIRA
emphasizes costs not for their own sake but because EPA prioritizes envi-
ronmental groups and environmental gains. Although we cannot disprove
this account, we observe that few scholars have substantiated the agency
capture story as a theoretical or empirical matter. 11 To the extent that our
data pique renewed interest in the story, we believe that certain changes are
necessary. Scholars should commit to perform sustained study of agency
behavior, and they should include analysis of White House offices in the
mix. Only then will scholars be well-positioned to defend the particular way
in which OIRA approaches its mission.
C. Other White House Involvement
We asked questions concerning the extent to which White House in-
volvement in agency rule-making other than OIRA review promotes
regulatory efficacy. For example, President Clinton established a practice of
issuing official directives to agency heads prescribing new regulatory policies
and announcing existing regulatory policies as his own. We investigated the
claim that presidential directives and announcements improved regulatory
efficacy by energizing agencies and inducing them to be more active. But
only 28%, or eight EPA respondents, stated that they ever were involved
• • 155
with a directive or announcement. Of these, respondents split on the extent
to which directives or announcements energized the agency and induced it
to be more active. 56 Nonetheless, 50% stated that White House involvement
sometimes energized the agency and induced it to be more active, and 29%
154. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 19-42; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 14, at 2297.
155. Question 69 asked, "Were you involved in a regulatory matter that was the subject of a
presidential directive issued in the form of a public memorandum to the EPA Administrator?" with
the possible answers: Yes (1), No (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine respondents
was 1.7, with 27.6% responding Yes, 65.5% No, and 6.8% Other. The results of an independent
samples t-test indicate that Bush-era EPA respondents scored significantly higher (M = 1.89, SD =
.33) in response to Question 69 than did the Clinton-era EPA respondents ((M = 1.61, SD = .50)
t(29) = -1.497, p<.001)). Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105.
156. Question 70.e asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "A presidential
directive spurred an EPA regulatory or other action that would not have taken place without the
directive" using a five-point scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True
(4), Always True (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the eight respondents was 2.4, with 25.0%
responding Never True, 25.0% Rarely True, 12.5% Sometimes True, 25.0% Often True, 0.0% Al-
ways True, and 12.5% Other. Question 79 asked respondents, "How often did the prospect of a
presidential announcement prompt White House staff to instigate an EPA regulatory activity that
would not have occurred absent White House involvement?" using a five-point scale: Never (1),
Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the fifteen re-
spondents was 1.5, with 60.0% responding Never, 20.0% Rarely, 13.3% Sometimes, 0.0% Often,
0.0% Always, and 6.7% Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I
respondents scored significantly higher (M = 3.00, SD = .00) in response to Question 79 than did
the Clinton respondents ((M = 1.25, SD = .45) t(15) = -5.292,p<.043)). Id.
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said it often did. 5 Furthermore, 61% said that White House involvement
sometimes or often induced the agency to change its regulatory priorities,
though 29% said rarely and 11% said never."'
These results suggest that White House involvement frequently ener-
gized the agency and induced it to be active, though not in the way that
scholars envision. First, presidential directives or announcements did not
meaningfully contribute to EPA invigoration. Only a small portion of EPA
respondents had experienced a directive or announcement. Moreover, those
respondents who had encountered a directive or announcement split on the
extent to which that directive or announcement induced the agency to be
more active. Second, White House involvement did not spur the EPA to un-
dertake new regulatory activity. Rather, it caused the EPA to reinforce the
basis for existing regulatory proposals. As one respondent remarked, the
EPA staff "tended to get energized to clarify or gain support for their posi-
tion."'' 9 Another commented, "[Y]ou had to sharpen the arguments, which
meant you mustered both the scientific and the value arguments.' ' '6 Finally,
White House involvement seldom induced the agency to change its regula-
tory policies.
We conclude that White House involvement may not enhance regulatory
efficacy defined as stimulating regulatory change. White House involvement
may induce agencies to fortify the basis for their regulatory proposals,
which is not without value. But it may not serve the particular energizing
role that scholars envision. EPA respondents provided little or no indication
that White House involvement spurred the agency to undertake new regula-
tory activity and only weak indication that it spurred the agency to alter its
regulatory priorities.
Perhaps White House involvement would have induced regulatory change
if it had included more formalized actions than it did with respect to EPA
regulatory activity. 16 For example, presidential directives and announcements
157. Question 67 asked, "How often would you say that White House involvement in EPA
regulatory activity energized the Agency and induced it to be more active?" using a five-point scale:
Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the
twenty-eight respondents was 3.1, with 7.1% responding Never, 10.7% Rarely, 50.0% Sometimes,
28.6% Often, 3.6% Always, and 0.0% Other. Id.
158. Question 68 asked, "How often would you say that White House involvement in EPA
regulatory activity induced the Agency [to] change its regulatory priorities?" using a five-point
scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of
the twenty-eight respondents was 2.5, with 10.7% responding Never, 28.6% Rarely, 57.1% Some-
times, 3.6% Often, 0.0% Always, and 0.0% Other. Id.
159. Id. at EPA Respondent BOO 1, response to Question 67.
160. Id. at EPA Respondent BO 12, response to Question 26; see also id. at EPA Respondent
C003, response to Question 26 ("[W]henever White House offices got involved, you went back and
double-checked ... that [your] scientific or technical basis was as good as it could be .. .[Tihat
didn't mean you do anything differently... "); id. at EPA Respondent B004, response to Question
12.a ("In some cases, OIRA and the threat of OIRA strengthened our economic analysis, which
ultimately helped us in court."); id. at EPA Respondent B014, response to Question 26 (stating that
White House involvement spurred EPA "[slimply to build an effective defense").
161. Kagan acknowledged that President Clinton did not take an interest in issuing directives
concerning EPA regulatory activity. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2308 & n.254.
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may provoke agencies to make progress in a way that less formalized contacts
do not. And executive orders-not just of the cost-benefit variety-also may
have similar effect.162 Of course, such formalized actions must appear with
some degree of regularity to do so. It is of some concern that President Clin-
ton issued very few with respect to EPA regulatory activity, even though
such regulatory activity is more pervasive than that of any other agency. In-
deed, scholars worry that widespread use of formalized actions is infeasible
and undesirable given the vast responsibilities of the chief executive. 63 Nev
ertheless, it is possible that increased use of such actions might generate
agency activism and thereby promote regulatory efficacy.,64
D. Political Accountability
The extent to which presidential control facilitates political accountabil-
ity depends on the extent to which it is transparent to public view and
responsive to public preferences. The two concepts are related to each
other-only if an action is visible may the public ensure that it reflects their
preferences. Furthermore, the two often are tied to faction resistance-only
if an action is visible may the public ensure that it reflects their preferences
and not narrow interests. We asked EPA respondents questions that measure
transparency and responsiveness in an absolute sense (i.e., the extent to
which White House involvement is transparent or responsive) as well as a
relative sense (i.e., the extent to which White House involvement is more
transparent and responsive than the actions of the EPA). We also asked ques-
tions about OIRA review specifically and about White House involvement
generally, including OIRA review. Because the data on OIRA review were
consistently less favorable than the data on White House involvement gener-
ally, we do not focus on the former data. Rather, we stick to the best case for
political accountability.
Beginning with transparency in an absolute sense, 97% of EPA respon-
dents stated that White House involvement was either not visible to the
public or only somewhat visible to the public (see Table C).165
162. See, e.g., Exec. Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994) (directing federal ac-
tions to address environmental justice in minority and low-income populations).
163. SeeBressman, supranote 12, at 511; Farina, supra note 1, at 185.
164. We do not take a position on whether presidential directives are constitutionally or statu-
torily permissible. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2250 & n.8.
165. Question 95 asked, "Which of the following would you say best characterizes White
House involvement in EPA rulemaking?" using a four- point scale: Not visible to the public (1),
Somewhat visible to the public (2), Mostly visible to the public (3), Fully visible to the public (4),
and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine respondents was 1.7, with 31.0% responding Not
visible to the public, 65.5% Somewhat visible to the public, 0.0% Mostly visible to the public, 0.0%
Fully visible to the public, and 3.4% Other. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105.
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TABLE C
WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING WOULD YOU SAY BEST CHARACTERIZES
WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT IN EPA RULE-MAKING?
30
28
26
24
22
20 66%
Not visible to the Somewhat visible Mostly visible to Fully visible to Other
public to the public the public the public
In addition, 90% said that the general media reported on White House
involvement rarely or sometimes. 66 The trade press was better, reporting
on White House involvement sometimes or often according to 90% of re-
spondents. 161
As between the White House and the EPA, 96% of EPA respondents
stated that the EPA provided the public with greater opportunities to iden-
tify and evaluate how regulatory decisions were made (see Table D). 161
166. Question 92 asked respondents, "How often did the general media report on White
House involvement in EPA rulemaking?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Some-
times (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine respondents
was 2.5, with 0.0% responding Never, 58.6% Rarely, 31.0% Sometimes, 6.9% Often, 0.0% Al-
ways, and 3.4% Other. Id.
167. Question 91 asked, "How often did the trade press report on White House involvement
in EPA rulemaking?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4),
Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine respondents was 3.3, with 3.4%
responding Never, 3.4% Rarely, 55.2% Sometimes, 34.5% Often, 0.0% Always, and 3.4% Other. Id.
168. Question 59 asked, "As between the White House and EPA, which provided the public
with greater opportunities to identify and evaluate how regulatory decisions were made?" with
the possible answers: White House (1), EPA (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-
eight respondents was 2.0, with 0.0% responding White House, 96.4% responding EPA, and
3.6% responding Other. Id.
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TABLE D
AS BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND EPA, WHICH PROVIDED THE
PUBLIC WITH GREATER OPPORTUNITIES TO IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE
How REGULATORY DECISIONS WERE MADE?
30
28
26
24
22
20
8
6
4
2 -.
0 0
66
White House EPA Other
When asked to identify the source of these opportunities, EPA respon-
dents named the notice-and-comment rule-making process, other public
hearings, the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and
various stakeholder and regional meetings. 69 Seventy-two percent of re-
spondents said that their actions were visible to the public more so or far
more so than those of the White House.sle Furthermore, 90% answered that
the White House was more able than the EPA to shield its actions from pub-
lic view. t7 '  Respondents also indicated that the media reported far less often
169. See, e.g., id. at EPA Respondent C007, response to Question 37; id. at EPA Respondent
C009, response to Question 37; id. at EPA Respondent B004, response to Question 37; id. at EPA
Respondent B 12, response to Question 37.
170. Question 96 asked, "To what extent were your actions visible to the public as compared
to those of the White House staff involved in EPA rulemaking?" using a five-point scale: Far less
visible to the public (1), Somewhat less visible to the public (2), Equally visible to the public (3),
More visible to the public (4), Far more visible to the public (5), and Other. The weighted mean of
the twenty-nine respondents was 3.9, with 10.3% responding Far less visible to the public, 6.9%Somewhat less visible to the public, 3.4% Equally visible to the public, 27.6% More visible to the
public, 44.8% Far more visible to the public, and 6.9% Other. Id.
171. Question 98 asked, "As between the White House and EPA, which was more able to
shield its actions regarding EPA rulemaking from public view?" with the possible answers: White
House (1), EPA (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine respondents was 1.0, with
89.7% responding White House, 3.4% responding EPA, and 6.9% responding Other. The answers to
Question 98 are consistent with the answers to Question 90, which asked "How often was the influ-
ence of the White House on EPA rulemaking open to public view?" using a five-point scale: Never
(1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-
nine respondents was 2.2, with 17.2% responding Never, 41.4% Rarely, 31.0% Sometimes, 3.4%
Often, 0.0% Always, and 6.9% Other. In addition, Question 81 asked the same question regarding
OIRA using the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.1,
with 7.1% responding Never, 75.0% Rarely, 3.6% Sometimes, 7.1% Often, 0.0% Always, and 7.1%
Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I respondents scored signifi-
cantly higher (M = 2.29, SD = .95) in response to Question 81 than did the Clinton respondents ((M
= 2.06, SD = .54) t(28) = -. 769, p<.050)). Id.
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on White House involvement in EPA rule-making. Thus, 76% said that the
EPA was more subject to media coverage than the White House regarding
an EPA regulation undergoing White House review.1
Respondents offered similar answers to a question directed at whether
White House influence was apparent in the administrative record available
to reviewing courts.' 73 According to 63% of EPA respondents, only rarely or
sometimes were changes arising from White House involvement apparent in
the record. This number actually understates the issue because a full 30%
indicated that they had no knowledge of the contents of the record. Of the
respondents who had awareness of the contents of the record, 90% stated
that the record either rarely or sometimes did not contain evidence of White
House involvement; the remaining 10% said it never did.
7 4
Respondents also addressed questions on whether presidential directives
and announcements augmented transparency. As discussed above, only 28%
of EPA respondents said that they were involved in a regulatory matter that
was the subject of a presidential directive issued in the form of a public
172. Question 97 asked, "As between the White House and EPA, which was subject to more
media coverage regarding an EPA regulation undergoing White House regulatory review?" with the
possible answers: White House (1), EPA (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine
respondents was 1.9, with 10.3% responding White House, 75.9% responding EPA, and 13.8%
responding Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I respondents
scored significantly lower (M = 1.75, SD = .46) in response to Question 97 than did the Clinton
respondents ((M = 1.94, SD = .24) t(29) = 1.369, p<.010)). The responses regarding the White
House as a whole are consistent with those regarding OIRA. For example, Question 85 asked re-
spondents, "How often were the names of the OIRA staff involved in EPA rulemakings included in
general media reports about the rulemakings?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Some-
times (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was
1.3, with 67.9% responding Never, 25.0% Rarely, 3.6% Sometimes, 0.0% Often, 0.0% Always, and
3.6% Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that the Bush I respondents scored
significantly higher (M = 1.56, SD = .73) in response to Question 85 than did the Clinton respon-
dents ((M = 1.22, SD = .43) t(28) = -1.508, p<.019)). Id.
173. Question 103 asked, "How often were changes in EPA regulations that arose from White
House involvement apparent in the administrative record available to reviewing courts?" using a
five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The
weighted mean of the thirty respondents was 2.4, with 6.7% responding Never, 26.7% Rarely,
36.7% Sometimes, 0.0% Often, 0.0% Always, and 30.0% Other. In addition, Question 99 inquired
about the transparency effects of Executive Order 12,866, which was issued during the Clinton
administration, after the Bush EPA respondents had left the EPA. Interestingly, the Bush respon-
dents, who could only speculate about the transparency effects of Executive Order 12,866, were
more sanguine about its effects than were the Clinton respondents who functioned under the Execu-
tive Order. Question 99 asked, "Did Executive Order 12,866 increase the transparency of White
House oversight of EPA rulemaking?" with the possible responses Yes (1), No (2), and Other. The
results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I respondents scored significantly lower
(M = 1.00, SD = .00) than did the Clinton respondents ((M = 1.46, SD = .52) t(16) = 1.500,
p<.000)). At the same time, some responses suggest that the Clinton OIRA reforms more generally
had a positive effect. Question 13 asked, "How often did OIRA involvement in EPA rulemaking lead
to improvements in EPA regulations?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes
(3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.9,
with 3.6% responding Never, 14.3% Rarely, 67.9% Sometimes, 3.6% Often, 3.6% Always, and
7.1% Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I respondents scored
significantly lower (M = 2.62, SD = 1.2) in response to Question 13 than did the Clinton respon-
dents ((M = 3.00, SD = .34) t(28) = 1.255, p<.001)). Id.
174. Id.
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memorandum to the EPA Administrator.' 75 Of that group, 75% said that in-
formation about the directive was substantially open to public view, and that
the media reported adequately on the directive.' A larger number, 50% of
all respondents, were aware of occasions on which the president took the
lead in announcing an EPA regulatory action. 77 But, in cases when the
president took the lead in announcing a regulatory action, 60% stated that
information about the White House involvement in the regulation was rarely
or never open to public view.1
7 s
On questions concerning responsiveness, respondents rated the White
House relatively low. They stated that the EPA more often represented the
public's views on particular regulatory matters than did the White House.79
While 68% said that the EPA represented the public's views more often than
the White House, only 11% said the opposite. When asked what aspects of
the EPA process made the agency more representative of the public's view,
respondents again highlighted the notice-and-comment rule-making process
and various stakeholder and regional meetings.
These data support three findings concerning White House involvement
in EPA regulatory activity. First, White House involvement seldom was
transparent to the public, either in an absolute sense or compared to the ac-
tions of the EPA. A large majority of EPA respondents scored White House
involvement relatively low on all measures of transparency, including visi-
bility to the public, opportunities for public view, media coverage, and
availability of information in the administrative record.
Second, the president (and most notably, President Clinton) demon-
strated little official involvement in EPA rule-makings. Although President
175. See supra note 155 (discussing results for Question 69).
176. Question 72 asked, "Was information about the presidential directive substantially open
to public view?" with the possible answers: Yes (1), No (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the
eight respondents was 1.3, with 75.0% responding Yes, 25.0% responding No, and 0.0% responding
Other. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105.
177. Question 75 asked, "Are you aware of occasions on which the President, as opposed to
EPA, took the lead in announcing an EPA regulatory action?" with the possible answers: Yes (1), No
(2), and Other. The weighted mean of the thirty respondents was 1.5, with 50.0% responding Yes
and 43.3% responding No, and 6.7% responding Other. In contrast, Question 89 asked "How often
did the President, Vice President or others at the White House publicly disclaim responsibility for an
EPA regulatory action?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3), Often (4),
Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-nine respondents was 1.6, with 48.3%
responding Never, 37.9% Rarely, 6.9% Sometimes, 0.0% Often, 0.0% Always, and 6.9% Other. The
results of an independent samples t-test indicate that the Bush I respondents scored significantly
higher (M = 1.75, SD = .89) in response to Question 89 than did the Clinton respondents ((M =
1.47, SD = .51) t(29) = -1.025, p<.007)). Id.
178. Question 80 asked, "When the White House was involved in the formulation or timing of
a regulation because of a presidential announcement, how often was information about the White
House involvement open to public view?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes
(3), Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the fifteen respondents was 2.2, with
26.7% responding Never, 33.3% Rarely, 13.3% Sometimes, 6.7% Often, 6.7% Always, and 13.3%
Other. Id.
179. Question 62 asked, "As between the White House and EPA, which more often repre-
sented the public's views on particular regulatory matters?" with the possible answers: White House
(1), EPA (2), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.9, with 10.7%
responding White House, 67.9% responding EPA, and 21.4% responding Other. Id.
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Clinton issued directives and announcements governing the regulatory ac-
tions of other agencies, he issued few concerning EPA regulatory actions.
Thus, he did not use these mechanisms to make his role in EPA regulatory
actions visible to the public.
Finally, White House involvement in EPA regulatory activity was not as
responsive to the public as were the actions of the EPA. By a considerable
margin, EPA respondents viewed themselves as more responsive by virtue
of the notice-and-comment rule-making process as well as other procedures,
including stakeholder and regional meetings. As a respondent described
those meetings, EPA regional officials would "go out and interact with the
public so the Agency would know what the impact of a regulation might
be."'80 These contacts occurred on "a day-to-day basis" in addition to the
"formal processes of informal rulemaking."'
8
'
We conclude that White House involvement in regulatory activity may
not sufficiently enhance political accountability. White House involvement
brings some regulatory activity under the control of the president, and it
therefore delivers some political accountability in a formal sense. (Of
course, White House involvement actually brings regulatory activity under
the control of the president only via White House staff, who in many cases
may be no more likely to reflect presidential views than do agency political
appointees.) But White House involvement may not promote much political
accountability in a functional sense-that is, with the aim of ensuring that
regulatory activity reflects public preferences and resists narrow influences.
By "public preferences," we intend nothing more or less specific than do
advocates of presidential control. Furthermore, we do not purport to know
exactly what EPA respondents mean by the phrase. In general, public pref-
erences might be understood as ones that reflect the majority will and
extend beyond the parochial interests of narrow groups. They might emanate
from a range of groups including voters, regulatory beneficiaries, stake-
holders, and participants in the notice-and-comment rule-making process.
Even if White House involvement somewhat reflects public preferences,
the actions of the EPA may more so. The reason is that EPA officials are
bound by administrative procedures and subject to media attention in a way
that White House involvement is not. Thus, EPA officials are not more re-
sponsive and transparent simply because they say so. Rather, they gather
more public input and receive more public scrutiny, both of which tend to
ensure that they will better assess public preferences and resist parochial
pressures. Of course, agency officials are not susceptible to direct electoral
reprisal if they fail in these respects. But they are subject at least to judicial
180. Id. at EPA Respondent C003, response to Question 64; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B004, response to Question 37 (highlighting "ANPR [advanced notice of proposed rulemaking],
workshops, other types of outreach to get information from the regulated community and environ-
mental groups, [and] meetings with people after the proposal to get their input on the docket").
181. Id. at EPA Respondent C008, response to Question 61; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B012, response to Question 61 (commenting that, in addition to the notice-and-comment process,
"the continuing consultation process" and "regional administrators" were "important source[s] of
input to the regulatory process").
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review. The upshot is that the Administrative Procedure Act may be surpris-
ingly successful-perhaps more so than executive orders or OIRA review-
182
at promoting the values for which political accountability stands.
It is possible to offer a more modest point: White House offices are in-
sufficiently transparent for accountability purposes, given the responsibility
they assert. To the extent that White House offices other than OIRA are the
ones handling the high-level issues, we have a particular need to know much
more about how they perform this function to ensure that they perform it
well. We currently know very little about the precise nature of White House
contacts."' Indeed, those contacts are difficult if not impossible to catalogue
unless the White House offices themselves commit to help. Even advocates
of presidential control recognize the need for increased transparency of the
White House's activities. " Our study intensifies the demand.
In this respect, it is again worth acknowledging that the president might
increase his comparative advantage by stepping up the use of formalized
control mechanisms such as public directives and public announcements.
Because directives and announcements are uniquely transparent forms of
presidential control, they might maximize political accountability. But, as
mentioned before, there is reason to doubt or resist the increased use of such
mechanisms as a means of improving transparency.' Rather, we should
focus on exposing the workings of the White House offices themselves, as
well as the relationship among them and with the president, OIRA, and
other federal agencies.
E. Faction Resistance
The extent to which presidential control improves the faction resistance
of agency decison-making tums on the extent to which presidential control
itself is impervious to parochial pressures. Advocates of presidential control
claim that the president is likely to resist factional influence because he is
beholden to a national constituency.186 Thus, the president is likely to repre-
182. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006) (finding that as the number
of comments from business groups increases, so does the influence of such groups on resulting
rules). But see Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical
Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. EcON. 175, 192-95 (1992); Marissa Martino Golden,
Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 259-64 (1998); David C. Nixon et al., With Friends Like These: Rule-
making Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 59 (2002) (concluding that the notice-and-comment process does not systematically
favor business interests).
183. Although Clinton's Executive Order 12,866 improved the transparency of OIRA review
over that of previous administrations by adding disclosure requirements, those requirements only
extend to outside contacts with OIRA staff, not other White House officials, during the formal
OIRA review process. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.ER. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 2006).
184. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2331-39.
185. See Bressman, supra note 12, at 511; Farina, supra note 1, at 185.
186. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 2337; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 105-06.
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sent the public interest on policy issues in the first instance, and is subject to
an electoral check if he does not. Others worry that the president often is
beholden to narrow interests and will seek to ensure that agency decison-
making favors such interests, often in ways that are not transparent to the
public."'
We tested these competing claims by asking which groups influenced
White House involvement in EPA rule-making (which might be called "fac-
tional inputs") and which interests benefited from such involvement (which
might be called "factional outputs") either because the White House sought
changes that advantaged certain interests more than others or because the
final regulation served certain interests more than others. As with political
accountability, we asked questions concerning White House involvement
collectively and OIRA review independently. We focus on the data concern-
ing White House involvement because it was consistently more favorable. 8
EPA respondents answered several questions measuring factional inputs.
According to 57% of EPA respondents, interest groups were sometimes able
to persuade the White House to seek changes in EPA rule-makings, and
29% said often.8 9 White House involvement was somewhat more influenced
by business groups and trade associations than environmental groups.1c Al-
though 86% stated that White House involvement sometimes or often was
influenced by business groups and trade associations, 64% said it sometimes
or often was influenced by environmental groups. Similarly, 86% indicated
that White House involvement was influenced often or sometimes by state
187. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 12, at 503-11; Morrison, supra note 43, at 1067; Shane,
supra note 35, at 209.
188. We previously addressed some of the questions related to OIRA in connection with
OIRA regulatory review. See supra Section III.B.
189. Question 55 asked, "How often were interest groups able to persuade the White House to
seek changes in EPA rulemakings?" using a five-point scale: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3),
Often (4), Always (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.2, with
0.0% responding Never, 7.1% Rarely, 57.1% Sometimes, 28.6% Often, 0.0% Always, and 7.1%
Other. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105.
190. Question 56.a asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "Business firms or
trade associations significantly influenced White House review of an EPA regulation" using a five-
point scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True (4), Always True (5),
and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.3, with 0.0% responding
Never True, 7.1% Rarely True, 53.6% Sometimes True, 35.7% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and
3.6% Other. The results of an independent samples t-test indicate that Bush I respondents scored
significantly lower (M = 3.13, SD = .35) in response to Question 56.a than did the Clinton respon-
dents ((M = 3.37, SD = .68) t(28) = .947, p<.005)). Question 56.b asked respondents to rate the
accuracy of the assertion "Environmental groups significantly influenced White House review of an
EPA regulation" using the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respon-
dents was 2.7, with 10.7% responding Never True, 21.4% Rarely True, 50.0% Sometimes True,
14.3% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 3.6% Other. Question 56.c asked respondents to rate the
accuracy of the assertion "State or local groups significantly influenced White House review of an
EPA regulation" using the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respon-
dents was 3.2, with 3.6% responding Never True, 10.7% Rarely True, 50.0% Sometimes True,
35.7% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 0.0% Other. Question 56.d asked respondents to rate the
accuracy of the assertion "Other federal agencies significantly influenced White House review of an
EPA regulation" using the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respon-
dents was 3.6, with 0.0% responding Never True, 0.0% Rarely True, 46.4% Sometimes True, 46.4%
Often True, 7. 1% Always True, and 0.0% Other. Id.
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and local groups. Finally, White House involvement was most influenced by
other federal agencies: 93% said sometimes or often.
As compared to the EPA, EPA respondents indicated that the White
House is more likely to be captured by an interest group.' 9' Sixty-one per-
cent of EPA respondents selected the White House and 18% selected the
EPA. However, 21% chose "Other." Given the bifurcated nature of the ques-
tion, the answer "Other" might mean that neither is likely to be captured by
an interest group or both are equally likely to be captured. Even if "Other" is
allocated to EPA, the White House still is more likely to be captured by an
interest group.
EPA respondents answered several questions that measure factional out-
puts. 92 Seventy-one percent stated that the White House never or rarely
sought changes that would make a regulation more protective of human
health and the environment; 21% said the White House sometimes sought
pro-health and environment changes (see Table E). At the same time, 61%
said that the White House sometimes sought changes that would make a
regulation less protective of human health and the environment, and 32%
said the White House often sought these changes. Sixty-one percent said
that the White House often sought changes that would make a regulation
less burdensome on regulated entities, and 36% said sometimes. Conversely,
86% said that the White House either never or rarely sought changes that
would make a regulation more burdensome for regulated entities. Finally,
54% said that the White House sometimes sought changes that would affect
which parties or geographic regions would bear a regulatory burden or gain
a regulatory benefit, although 29% said that the White House rarely sought
region-specific changes.
191. Question 65 asked, "As between the White House and EPA, which was more likely to be
captured by an interest group?" with the possible answers: White House (1), EPA (2), and Other.
The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.2, with 60.7% responding White House,
17.9% responding EPA, and 21.4% responding Other. Id.
192. Question 52.a asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "The White House
sought changes that would make a regulation more protective of human health and the environment"
using a five-point scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True (4), Al-
ways True (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.1, with 17.9%
responding Never True, 53.6% Rarely True, 21.4% Sometimes True, 3.6% Often True, 0.0% Always
True, and 3.6% Other. Question 52.b asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "The
White House sought changes that would make a regulation less protective of human health and the
environment" using the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents
was 3.2, with 0.0% responding Never True, 3.6% Rarely True, 60.7% Sometimes True, 32.1% Often
True, 0.0% Always True, and 3.6% Other. Question 52.c asked respondents to rate the accuracy of
the assertion "The White House sought changes that would make a regulation less burdensome for
regulated entities" using the same five-point scale. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respon-
dents was 3.7, with 0.0% responding Never True, 0.0% Rarely True, 35.7% Sometimes True, 60.7%
Often True, 3.6% Always True, and 0.0% Other. Question 52.d asked respondents to rate the accu-
racy of the assertion "The White House sought changes that would make a regulation more
burdensome for regulated entities." The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.8,
with 39.3% responding Never True, 46.4% Rarely True, 14.3% Sometimes True, 0.0% Often True,
0.0% Always True, and 0.0% Other. Question 52.e asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the
assertion "The White House sought changes that would affect which parties or geographic regions
would bear a regulatory burden or gain a regulatory benefit" using the same five-point scale. The
weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.7, with 3.6% responding Never True, 28.6%
Rarely True, 53.6% Sometimes True, 10.7% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 3.6% Other. Id.
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TABLE E
THE WHITE HOUSE SOUGHT CHANGES THAT WOULD
MAKE A REGULATION MORE PROTECTIVE OF HUMAN
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
Z 16
214
2
z io
4
00
Never Tre Rarely True Sometimes True Often True Always True Other
Of separate note, EPA respondents answered questions that measure na-
tional outputs. Half (52%) stated that the White House sometimes sought
changes that would advance national interests over the positions of interest
groups, while 29% said only sometimes and only 18% said rarely.' 93 Simi-
larly, 61% of EPA respondents stated that White House involvement in EPA
rule-making often served national policy interests, while 25% said some-
times and 7% said rarely. No respondent said never in response to either
question. 194
These data suggest three findings. First, according to EPA respondents,
business groups exerted somewhat more influence on White House involve-
ment in EPA rule-making than environmental groups did. Federal agencies
exerted the most influence of all. Thus, the inputs were slightly skewed to-
ward business interests and even more so toward the interests of governmental
agencies. Environmental interests got the short end of the stick.
Second, the outputs favored narrow interests. EPA respondents indicated
that the White House readily sought changes that would reduce burdens on
regulated entities, and veered from those that would increase such burdens.
Yet EPA respondents suggested that the White House did not hesitate to
193. Question 52.f asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the assertion "The White House
sought changes that would advance national interests over the positions of interest groups." The
weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.1, with 0.0% responding Never True, 17.9%
Rarely True, 50.0% Sometimes True, 28.6% Often True, 0.0% Always True, and 3.6% Other. Id.
194. Question 58.a asked respondents to rate "the following sets of interests as to how often
those interests were served by the White House's involvement in EPA rulemaking: National policy
interests" using a five-point scale: Never True (1), Rarely True (2), Sometimes True (3), Often True
(4), Always True (5), and Other. The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 3.6, with
0.0% responding Never True, 7.1% Rarely True, 25.0% Sometimes True, 60.7% Often True, 3.6%
Always True, and 3.6% Other. Id.
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seek changes that reduced protections for human health and the environ-
ment, and routinely eschewed changes with a positive effect. It also
frequently sought changes that reflected a regional preference or focus. In
short, even if the inputs of White House involvement in EPA rule-makings
favored business interests only to a limited extent, the outputs favored them
to a much greater extent. Alternatively, looking back at the inputs, federal
agencies often may have pressed for changes that favored business interests,
suggesting that both inputs and outputs favored such interests.
Finally, the White House, for the most part, served a nationalizing role.
Seventy-nine percent of EPA respondents said that the White House some-
times or often sought changes that would further national interests in
comparison to the positions of interests groups, and the number increased
slightly (to 86%) when asked whether White House involvement served na-
tional policy interests in the abstract.' 95 At the same time, a non-trivial
number said that the White House rarely acted in ways that supported na-
tional interests. Not one respondent said that the White House never
furthered national interests. Thus, respondents believe that the White House,
on balance, advanced national interests.
Interpreting the data in this light, we conclude with a potential puzzle.
Although the White House sought parochial results, it nevertheless served a
nationalizing role. How can EPA respondents believe that the White House
simultaneously favors special interests and furthers national interests? Per-
haps respondents believe that the impulse to favor special interests is
entirely compatible with the inclination to further national interests. Put dif-
ferently, respondents might believe the common tale about agency behavior:
"health and safety agencies are frequently captured by pro-health and safety
constituencies, leading systematically to overzealous and inefficient regula-
tion."'' 96 On this account, the White House furnishes a check on
environmental overreaching-a check that EPA officials may appreciate,
even if against self-interest. Two respondents offered comments consistent
with this story, remarking that "reducing burdens was in the national inter-
est"' 97 and that "[m]any people would say EPA was insufficiently sensitive
to the need to preserve the nation's industrial base."' 98
To the extent that EPA respondents believe in the occurrence of agency
capture, we again note that scholars have some catching up to do. First,
scholars may have to start taking seriously the possibility of agency capture.
As previously mentioned, many scholars largely have discounted this theory
195. See supra notes 193-194.
196. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 3.
197. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C001, response to
Question 27.f; cf id. at EPA Respondent B007, response to Question 27.a (noting that OIRA could
"use their authority to carve out things that don't add value overall").
198. Id. at EPA Respondent C009, response to Question 27.f; cf id. at EPA Respondent B006,
response to Question 19 ("EPA gave extremely little weight to economic judgments.").
[Vol. 105:47
October 2006] Inside the Administrative State 89
as lacking evidence and theoretical basis. 9 9 They might have to look again,
and they may need to account for the role of the various White House of-
fices in this story. Second, scholars may have to begin approaching the issue
of presidential control more precisely, not as generally enhancing agency
legitimacy but as specifically combating agency capture or reducing regula-
tory excess. The Clinton-era advocates, for one, do not demonstrate such a
focus. °°
But we are skeptical that most respondents regarded the White House as
curbing agency excesses in a way that so easily reconciles the impulse to
favor special interests with the inclination to further national interests. Other
respondents offered other views. For example, some valued the White
House for providing occasional political cover for otherwise unpopular EPA
regulations.20 ' But many more saw the White House as conveying a broader
perspective on rule-making than the EPA alone. As one respondent ob-
served, "the Office of the President can inject broader public interest
considerations than might be implemented by EPA, 20 2 and "White House
involvement is healthy on issues of public interest. It is a healthy constraint
on EPA's exercise of judgment, which can be based too narrowly on envi-
ronmental interests. 20 ' Another stated that "[i]t was the president who
understood this stuff ... the political system. [We need] people who under-
stand [the EPA regulatory process] at 35,000 feet.' '204 More explicitly,
another remarked that "the White House staff sees its job as protecting the
president ... and there are tradeoffs. Protecting the environment is not the
only priority .... The staff at EPA could be 'obtuse' at the political effects
of their decisions or how they were conveyed .... There is a limit to what
you can get away with in a democracy."205 We think that these respondents
reflected the prevailing sentiment. They indicated that the White House
199. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 19-41; DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 14, at
2297.
200. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 2248 (asserting that President Clinton understood his
control activities as "generally sympathetic to regulatory efforts").
201. See, e.g., Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C009, re-
sponse to Question 22 ("The White House sees its job as protecting the President .... The staff at
EPA could be 'obtuse' at the political effects of their decisions or how they were conveyed."); id. at
EPA Respondent B007, response to Question 107 ("It was the President who understood this stuff
... the political system.").
202. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C016, response to
Question 62; see also id. at EPA Respondent B002, response to Question 107 ("There is a legitimate
role for the White House. The President is elected and gets to make some of the major decisions ...
.d).
203. Id. at EPA Respondent CO 16, response to Question 107.
204. ld. at EPA Respondent B007, response to Question 107.
205. Id. at EPA Respondent C009, response to Question 22; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B006, response to Question 63 (stating that the White House "was responding to a large number of
political constituencies" and that "a decision might be great from the perspective of the environment
but not politically salient"); id. at EPA Respondent B007, response to Question 19 (remarking that
"it's not like EPA was pristine ... [the agency] often was reflecting God-knows-what .... There
was a worry about ... splintering accountability and no one doing a good job .... OIRA has no
meaning but what the President gives it .... [W]e hold the President accountable.").
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conveys a perspective otherwise missing from EPA rule-making, rather than
curbing regulatory excess or providing political cover. They, like many ad-
vocates of presidential control, emphasize that the president plays a
democratizing role by balancing broad interests-public and political as
well as environmental.2
Yet it is this view that gives rise to the puzzle: in what sense does the
White House play this role if it systematically tilts regulation toward regu-
lated entities? Of course, business interests may trump environmental
interests without raising red flags. In regulatory decision-making, often one
set of interests must prevail to the exclusion of others-for example, the
interests of regulated entities (or their workers or consumers) over the inter-
ests of regulatory beneficiaries. The difficulty is distinguishing legitimate
interest balancing from impermissible interest skewing. EPA respondents
indicate that business interests consistently dominate, raising reason for
concern as to whether or how often the White House actually balances na-
tional interests.
Even if they believe that the White House too often skews regulation,
EPA respondents convey a degree of optimism about presidential control
that bears exploring. Perhaps they believe that the president deserves a role
in agency decision-making, for good or for bad, simply because he is the
president. Or perhaps they believe that the White House could engraft a na-
tional perspective, despite experience to the contrary. On this view, EPA
respondents can be understood to signal an aspiration for presidential con-
trol. They can be seen to recognize that White House involvement has broad
potential in theory, even if it has fallen short in operation. This is quite the
opposite of the bad agency story. Rather than pursuing their missions over-
zealously, respondents recognize the need to yield to higher authority, even
though that authority has exercised power in worrisome ways.
In the end, we conclude that EPA respondents tended to confirm the
fears of critics that the White House frequently favors special interests when
it gets involved in agency decision-making, but they still shared the hopes of
advocates that the White House often nationalizes such decision-making.
Although the White House is only somewhat more influenced by business
groups than environmental groups (and is most influenced by other federal
agencies), the White House regularly seeks changes that serve regulated
entities. It bears repeating that this is the best case for presidential control-
the data concerning OIRA review reflected far more special interest favorit-
ism. 20 7 That said, EPA respondents were not hostile to presidential control.
None said that the White House did not belong in agency rule-making. And
many said that the White House serves a legitimate role, placing agency
rule-making in a national context. Respondents demonstrate respect for de-
mocratic government, notwithstanding its shortcomings.
But make no mistake: those shortcomings require attention. At bottom,
we underscore a need to fortify White House involvement, whether in terms
206. E.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 105-06.
207. See supra notes 141-143.
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of faction resistance or political accountability or regulatory efficacy. Fac-
tion resistance, for example, may depend on transparency. A decision that is
visible to the public is less likely to favor private interests in the first in-
stance, and is subject to reprisal after the fact. If White House involvement
is insufficiently transparent to promote political accountability, it also may
be insufficiently transparent to inhibit factional influence. The next Part
turns to suggestions for improving, or even reworking, the practice of presi-
dential control.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
We set out to examine the effect of White House involvement from the
agency side and revealed a picture far less affirmative than previous empiri-
cal analyses. That picture is not conclusive; it too reflects a single perspective
on a practice involving many players. But it is different from previous descrip-
tions because it does not validate what has become, in relatively short order,
the prevailing view of the administrative state. As a result, it furnishes an op-
portunity to reconsider the operation of presidential control.
Note that the picture of White House involvement from the agency side
does not provide so strong an occasion to rethink the propriety or legality of
presidential control. EPA respondents generally did not question whether
the president has a valid role to play in agency decision-making. On this
fundamental point, they demonstrated substantial agreement with White
House and OIRA political officials. What EPA respondents primarily dis-
puted was whether the president or the White House offices (including
OIRA) did their jobs in a fashion that enhanced agency legitimacy-the
ostensible purpose of the presidential control model, or any model of admin-
istrative law.
This Part highlights six areas for improvement that emerge from the
agency experience with presidential control. Three apply to both OIRA and
other White House Offices: transparency, lines of responsibility, and selec-
tivity. Three concern OIRA alone: focus on costs, timing of review, and
entrenchment of career staff. In this Part, we do not endorse specific
changes. Rather, we focus attention on possible weaknesses. At a minimum,
we believe that these weaknesses suggest an agenda for further empirical
investigation. Scholars should attempt to verify whether these vulnerabilities
actually exist by studying OIRA, other White House offices, and other
agencies-and within each of those entities, both the political appointees
and career staffers. Scholars also might look to other sources of information,
including the trade press and the general media. If the weaknesses also
prompt interest at the theoretical level, scholars might turn their efforts to
determining how best to remedy them.
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A. Transparency
Few would dispute that White House involvement in agency decison-
208making should be more visible to the public. As one EPA respondent re-
marked, "What you want, ideally, is for White House involvement to be on
the record.,,209 Another observed, "It lacks transparency. The tradeoff among
competing interests is less clear with presidential oversight than agency de-
cisionmaking or even congressional oversight .... Public oversight is
dampened and [EPA's] credibility is damaged."'20
While the importance of transparency is uncontested, the means for in-
creasing it vary. President Clinton used official directives and
announcements to proclaim ownership of agency policies, but he did not do
so with any regularity for all issues or agencies, including the EPA. EPA
respondents had other recommendations for improving the transparency of
White House involvement. One suggested that the White House have an
opportunity "to comment formally with the timing of the comment process,
the same as any other agency."2 ' Another remarked that "[tihere is a strong
public benefit to more accurate docketing of White House contacts and
changes on substantive ... issues, 21 2 suggesting the possibility of a more
complete meetings log than the one that OIRA maintains. These proposals
are not without negatives. Restricting the White House to submit comments
in the rule-making process may prevent the president from early interven-
tion in agency policy-making. It may cause the White House to issue
boilerplate comments, masking actual influence. Or it may inhibit truly
beneficial guidance that, for benign reasons, requires confidentiality. Insist-
ing on a public docket allows the president to maintain early intervention,
though it may dampen participation. In any event, it may require a central
record-keeper other than OIRA, one that can gather information from as
many as nineteen other White House offices.
Nevertheless, the point is taken: White House involvement should be
more transparent. Such transparency may depend, more than anything, on
the willingness of the president to insist that non-OIRA White House offices
voluntarily document their interactions with the EPA and with interest
groups regarding EPA rule-makings. Even OIRA, which currently maintains
208. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2331-39.
209. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C003, response to
Question 107; see also id. at EPA Respondent B004, response to Question 107 (recommending that
White House involvement in EPA rule-making be "much more transparent"); id. at EPA Respondent
B006, response to question 106 (recommending that OIRA increase "transparency and the record");
id. at EPA Respondent B012, response to Question 107 (recommending that the White House "open
up the process-[make it] open and accessible").
210. Id. at EPA Respondent CO 12, response to Question 107.
211. Id. at EPA Respondent C003, response to Question 107.
212. Id. at EPA Respondent CO 11, response to Question 107; id. at EPA Respondent B009,
response to Question 40 ("EPA had to keep records of who it spoke to, OIRA did not. EPA was
much more open.").
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a meetings log, does not record contacts as extensively as it might. 213 Simi-
larly, transparency may depend on whether White House policy advisors are
willing or can be directed by the president to submit to more media cover-
age. White House policy advisors, and not the president directly, are usually
the ones exerting the actual influence on agency decision-making.2 4 Yet
EPA respondents report that the names of White House staff rarely appear in
either the trade press or the general media, far less often than the names of
EPA staff.
B. Lines of Responsibility
Advocates of presidential control argue that the president, because he is
a single official, is uniquely visible and accountable. 25" As EPA respondents
recount the experience, presidential control was not a unified enterprise but
coalitions of different offices competing for influence over EPA rule-
making. OIRA often was in the middle, brokering regulatory bargains in
some cases and used by certain White House offices to combat other White
House offices in other cases, rather than just for the independent value of its
review. Furthermore, EPA respondents recalled that little of this was re-
ported regularly in the trade press or the general media-neither disputes
between OIRA and the EPA or other White House offices and the EPA, nor
the names of particular OIRA or White House staff.
This dynamic has two effects. First, the agency faces many managers
rather than one. As a result, the agency has difficulty assessing and follow-
ing administration policy. Thus, one EPA respondent stated, "There was
overlap and confusion in people's roles with respect to the environment,
[which was] inevitable given [that this is] an area of great interest. Everyone
thought they had ownership of these environmental decisions, even though
you had an EPA with responsibility for these decisions .... A lot of people
who wanted to claim credit, take the lead. ' 216 The multiplicity of voices
through which presidential control speaks inhibits it from speaking authori-
tatively or effectively. A degree of internal coordination would benefit the
rule-making process by reducing the number of cooks, or head chefs, in the
kitchen. In the words of a respondent, "I would look for more clarity about
213. Although Executive Order 12,866 requires OIRA to disclose outside contacts and main-
tain a meetings log, these requirements apply to the period of formal OIRA review. See Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 2006);
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 18.
214. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2337-38.
215. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 11, at 152; Calabresi, supra note 11, at 58-70.
216. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C017, response to
Question 107; see also id. at EPA Respondent B002, response to Question 107 (noting that the roles
of OIRA and other White House offices differ); id. at EPA Respondent BO 12, response to Question
106 ("[Tlhe process was much less predictable than it looks on paper.").
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how the White House makes decisions and who in the White House is the
principal overseer of EPA. 21 7
Second, the public has difficulty determining which office or offices are
responsible for agency rule-making. While it is possible to credit (or blame)
the White House as a whole, a great advantage of presidential control is that
it promises more specific lines of responsibility. This, for example, is the
promise underlying presidential use of public directives and public an-
nouncements." 8 In any event, transparency and responsiveness should be
understood to anticipate more than superficial awareness that the president
is in charge. They instead should be considered to demand concrete knowl-
edge of how the White House controls agency decison-making. Put
differently, transparency and responsiveness should be taken as entitling
voters to understand the actual basis for agency decison-making and to
evaluate whether such decison-making represents their interests. Thus, the
public should have knowledge of precisely who among those clamoring for
credit (including the agency) are responsible for particular policies. They
also should have the information necessary to understand how the White
House offices relate to each other as well as to the president, OIRA, and
other federal agencies.
C. Selectivity
EPA respondents indicated that White House involvement, whether
through OIRA or other offices, is uneven and unsystematic. For White
House involvement to enhance agency legitimacy, it must reach agency de-
cison-making in a less haphazard way. And simply making transparent
whatever occasional interactions currently exist will not do the trick. Unless
White House involvement is reasonably methodical, it does not really con-
stitute a model of control at all.
Of course, the president cannot manage all decisions, even all major de-
cisions, in the administrative state. The president has broad constitutional
duties that prevent the diversion of his efforts in this way. If White House
involvement is to be meaningful, the issue must be one of reasonableness.
White House involvement must be logical and orderly enough that it reliably
reaches matters of public importance as well as political interest.
White House involvement in EPA rule-makings during the Bush I and
Clinton administrations frequently did not qualify. White House offices of-
ten did not set overall regulatory policy. Presidential directives and
announcements, important tools of presidential control, were rare. Perhaps
the EPA was an outlier-a claim subject to empirical testing. The difficulty
is that it should not have been. The EPA generates the most rule-makings
with the most costs, and therefore should be the subject of presidential con-
217. Id. at EPA Respondent C021, response to Question 107; id. at EPA Respondent B004,
response to Question 7 ("It was difficult to tell where comments were coming from... .
218. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2250.
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trot at least as often as other agencies. The presidential control model must
account for oversight of the EPA and other regulatory agencies.
Moreover, the very selectivity of White House intervention during this
time raises potential concerns. Although the White House expressly limited
regulatory review to high-cost rule-makings, it may have gotten involved in
the issues among those rules that it deemed most important, leaving others
to the EPA. Self-selection of this sort does not ensure that even all signifi-
cant rule-makings receive high-level political attention of the sort that
renders them more accountable and faction-proof. Rather, it ensures presi-
dential supervision only of those rule-makings that already have political
salience because they concern particular subjects or groups. But presidential
control, as a model of agency legitimacy, is not simply a means for involv-
ing politics in chosen decison-making; it stakes a broader claim to
rationalize and check agency decison-making. More specifically, it aims to
ensure that agency decison-making, in the absence of an electoral check, is
not ad hoc or irrational or driven by factional influences. Many seeking such
assurance may find it lacking.
Nevertheless, it is tempting to view some White House intervention as
better than none. The difficulty is that some intervention may lead to a
skewing of the administrative process. White House scrutiny may attach to
rules that are excessively burdensome on regulated entities but not those that
are insufficiently protective of human health and the environment. Perhaps it
is hard to imagine the need for White House involvement on this side be-
cause the EPA does a good job of pressing for health and environmental
protections. But if White House involvement is to serve an energizing role,
it might prompt the EPA to take more aggressive action than even the
agency thought politically feasible. Thus, White House involvement might
seek to avoid under-regulation as well as over-regulation. In any event, the
presidential control model envisions White House supervision not simply in
the service of regulated entities or cost considerations but rather national
interests and public benefits. A "one-way ratchet" does not suffice."'
D. Timing of Review
Some EPA respondents commented that OIRA review occurs too late in
the rule-making process. OIRA "is a reactive organization. It receives rules
over the transom that agencies have already prepared. [OIRA has] ninety
days to review [the rules and] on the eighty-ninth day, they say 'we don't
like it, do over.' Early interaction would be helpful so that we don't waste
each other's time.' 220 Similarly, one respondent recommended "[e]arlier dis-
cussions of the rules .... [S]ome rules were in the process for five, ten,
219. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 8.
220. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C006, response to
Question 107; see also id. at EPA Respondent B013, response to Question 107 (recommending that
White House involvement in EPA rule-making occur "earlier in the process"); id. (recommending
that fundamental questions be "vetted sooner").
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fifteen years. [The late intervention] happens because there's supposed to be
such a division, a separation. But when the rubber hits the road, it's
tough."22' EPA respondents echo what scholars have long been saying: "Too
often OIRA has become involved at very late stages, operating as a kind of
last-minute barrier to action at a point when cooperation and trust are nearly
impossible. 222
It may be that pre-proposal involvement is preferable to end-stage re-
view. Early OIRA involvement would waste less agency time and breed less
agency frustration, if not improve overall regulatory efficacy. The problem,
however, is that it is even more difficult to ensure transparency for pre-
proposal White House influence than for post-proposal influence, now os-
tensibly subject to the disclosure requirements of Executive Order 12,866.23
Early intervention without firm steps to ensure greater transparency might
exacerbate accountability and faction concerns. One option might be to ex-
tend the current disclosure requirements from post-proposal OIRA review to
pre-proposal OIRA intervention, as well as to require that OIRA docket
contacts not only with outsiders but with other White House offices and fed-
eral agencies.
In any event, proposals for fixing the timing of OIRA review are secon-
dary to those for fixing the focus of OIRA review. EPA respondents most
faulted OIRA review for skewing the administrative process in a deregula-
tory direction because of its excessive focus on costs, especially in the short-
term. That issue is next.
E. Focus on Costs
EPA respondents criticized OIRA for concentrating almost exclusively
on costs, and recommended that OIRA expand its focus on benefits: "I used
to say to the OIRA Administrator, 'I want to see the people you have work-
ing help me find more benefits than the costs.' I would ask, 'who is working
on the benefits?' ,224 Cost-benefit analysis conveys "important information
but I'd probably want to... change it to something which looked at benefits
to the public., 225 These respondents did not recommend jettisoning cost-
benefit analysis, but requested that OIRA fairly analyze both components
rather than just one.
221. Id. at EPA Respondent C010, response to Question 107; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B014, response to Question 107 (remarking that OIRA "engaged in late intervention," which was
"demoralizing" and hard to defend as "anything other than a naked effort to preserve their preroga-
tive").
222. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 36, at 16 (citation omitted).
223. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.ER. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 2006).
224. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C001, response to
Question 107.
225. Id. at EPA Respondent C002, response to Question 107; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B009, response to Question 40 (commenting that EPA "took the benefits of the regulation more
seriously than the White House, [which was] more focused on the costs").
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Some EPA respondents also criticized OIRA for asserting positions on
issues far beyond its economic expertise. For example, OIRA on occasion
questioned whether the science really supported the results that the EPA had
claimed. Whether or not OIRA actually had the authority to challenge
agency scientific judgments, these respondents believed that it lacked the
competcnce. One EPA respondent recalled asking an OIRA staffer, "[W]hen
did [you] get a PhD in epidemiology? I must've missed that. 226 These re-
spondents suggested that OIRA challenged the science as a means to avoid
regulation and reduce costs.
Again, it is possible to offer the conventional account of agency over-
reaching in OIRA's defense. Specifically, OIRA seeks to counteract the
regulatory excesses that result when agencies pursue the interests of health
227and safety constituencies, irrespective of costs or any other considerations.
But, again, this assumes that OIRA is not battling a bogey. Scholars have
found little evidence that agencies are captured by the interests that they
regulate or protect."' Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated that neither
the political science literature nor the public choice literature predicts that
agencies will behave in this narrow-minded fashion.229 Our data do not ad-
dress this point, but they may suggest the need for further study of the
agency capture story. Absent further study, it remains unclear whether OIRA
has any basis, except its own institutional bias in favor of business interests,
for prioritizing costs to such an extent.
230
At any rate, it is entirely reasonable to expect that OIRA fully evaluate
benefits as well as costs.2' Furthermore, it is worth asking which costs and
benefits should count. According to EPA respondents, OIRA typically fo-
cused more on short-term costs and benefits, while the EPA typically
focuses on long-term costs and benefits. A focus on short-term costs and
benefits may tend to favor business interests because regulatory costs often
are immediate and environmental benefits often are latent. Focus on long-
term costs and benefits may tend to favor environmental interests for pre-
cisely the same reason.
In addition to expanding its focus on benefits, OIRA should avoid issues
that outstrip its institutional competence. While economists may be adept at
quantifying costs and benefits, they are not well-equipped to re-evaluate
agency scientific determinations-even if those scientific determinations in-
evitably bear on the cost-benefit analysis. As regulatory review currently
stands, OIRA should credit the science rather than undermine it. If regulatory
226. Id. at EPA Respondent C006, response to Question 17; see also id. at EPA Respondent
B007, response to Question 14 (stating that OIRA would give "policy advice in legal clothing").
227. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 1080-82.
228. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 14, at 2297.
229. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 19-41.
230. See id.
23 I. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2002).
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review is extended to include scientific review, OIRA (or other White House
offices) should acquire additional scientific expertise.
OIRA reform might involve simply repairing the cost-benefit analysis,
or it might extend beyond narrow fixes. For example, we might seek to re-
place cost-benefit analysis with a different or broader standard for
evaluating regulatory policy."' Or we might seek to improve the structure of
OIRA in ways that reinforce its coherence and coordination functions.233
Alternatively, we might seek to abolish OIRA entirely as a tool of presidential
control. Although our study does not indicate whether modest or more funda-
mental reform is appropriate, it does suggest that some reform is necessary.
F. Entrenchment of Career Staff
The entrenchment of OIRA career staff may stand as an impediment to
reform, even of the most modest variety. While scholars look to career staff
234to provide continuity and consistency in the face of factional pressure,
EPA respondents suggested a different picture. From their perspective, ca-
reerism diminished political responsiveness and converted OIRA into a
virtual government unto itself. These respondents remarked that many
OIRA career staffers had been there "since Reagan" and often took posi-
tions adverse to those of political officials, including the president.231 If
career staffers are so wedded to their approach, then they may not respond
to positive instruction. The solution is "more turn-over in the career staff at
OIRA 
23 6
This suggestion, even more than others, would benefit from further in-
vestigation. Few theoretical scholars have focused on the particular
composition of OIRA as a contributor to the strengths and weaknesses of
White House regulatory review. Few empirical scholars have interviewed
OIRA career staffers. At a minimum, it would be worth pursuing answers to
232. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 5, at 50; Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the
Administrative Procedure Act Procedural, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 157-62 (2003); cf Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 186 (2000) (urging
that cost-benefit analysis separate efficiency from distributional issues, and expressing doubt that
agencies can succeed in addressing distributional issues).
233. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 24, at 59-72.
234. See Croley, supra note 3, at 873-74.
235. Presidential Control Survey, supra note 105, at EPA Respondent C023, response to
Question 106 ("It did seem that the civil servants in OIRA, who had been there largely since the
Reagan Administration and Bush I, were more conservative and suspicious of EPA regulations than
the political appointees. But they had such power because of their knowledge and day-to-day in-
volvement that they had such great influence."); id. at EPA Respondent C006, response to Question
51 ("They were holdovers from the Reagan Administrations, for crying out loud .... they did what
they thought they were supposed to be doing for the regulation instead of what the political manag-
ers wanted."); id. at EPA Respondent B002, response to question 106 ('There is a legitimate role for
OIRA looking across the government because EPA 'stovepipes.' But I'm not sure they fulfilled it
very well. The Competitiveness Council was much more aligned with what we wanted to do than
OIRA. [With OIRA, we were dealing with] entrenched career people who wouldn't listen to their
political bosses.").
236. Id. at EPA Respondent C022, response to Question 107.
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questions such as the following: Did OIRA staffers press certain results even
when adverse to the positions of the political leadership? Did the OIRA ca-
reer staff perceive differences in their mission under Bush I (who embraced,
at least in part, the Reagan Era deregulatory agenda) and Clinton (who took
a less deregulatory view)? Can OIRA staffers identify examples when inde-
pendence operated as a restraint on factional influence? Did OIRA career
staffers perceive their role as reducing regulatory burdens or ensuring that
costs and benefits were accurately estimated? These questions seek to de-
termine whether OIRA career staffers served to minimize politicization of
the regulatory review process or skewed that process and the resultant
agency decison-making in a deregulatory direction.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the first to consider the practice of presidential control
from inside the agency. By looking inside the agency, we do not simply ex-
amine the ways in which the White House sets regulatory policy. Rather, we
move forward to investigate the ways in which agencies experience such
policy. Our empirical study presents data and conclusions from a survey of
high-level EPA officials, nominated by the president and confirmed by the
Senate, during the Bush I and Clinton administrations. Unlike prior empiri-
cal analyses, our study concludes that the presidential control model may
not entirely succeed in enhancing agency legitimacy. We do not suggest that
the model lacks merit, however. We contend that it requires reworking to
remain valid. Scholars can no longer rest satisfied with generalities about
political accountability, faction resistance, and regulatory effectiveness.
They must take steps to improve the presidential control model so that it
better delivers these goods in practice as well as in theory. We aim to begin
that process.
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